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The Great Writ in the Peach State:
Georgia Habeas Corpus, 1865-1965
By Donald E. Wilkes, Jr. *
The writ of habeas corpus has always been regarded as a bulwark
of the liberty of English-speaking people. It is safeguarded in the
constitution of our State. It is a summary and speedy remedy ....
- Richards v. McHan, 139 Ga. 37, 39, 76 S.E. 382, 383 (1912).
[T]he remedy to discharge a person held illegally in custody
under any form of law or without law is as old as the foundations
of English liberty. It is the writ of habeas corpus ....
That
remedy in complete, and it had better be adhered to.
- Southern Express Co. v. Lynch, 65 Ga. 240, 244-45 (1880).

The right of any citizen to have the legality of his restraint
inquired into by the courts on a writ of habeas corpus is as old
as English liberty itself, and will no doubt endure as long as any
institution of our government exists.
- Barrangerv. Baum, 103 Ga. 465, 482, 30 S.E. 524, 531 (1898).

Introduction

T

writing on the Great Writ
of scholarly
is a plenitude
here
of Habeas
Corpus, which
is universally recognized as "one
of the decisively differentiating factors between our democracy
and totalitarian governments."' The overwhelming majority of
these scholarly publications are concerned with the writ of habeas
corpus as administered in the federal court system. There are far
fewer scholarly publications on the writ of habeas corpus as
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administered in the courts of the State of Georgia, and most of
these works are concerned with Georgia habeas corpus as a state
postconviction remedy, past and present.2 Only one scholarly
piece, a law review article, provides a comprehensive view of the
writ of habeas corpus in Georgia. It covers the time span from
1733 (when the Georgia colony was founded) until 1865 (when
the Civil War concluded).'

This Article provides a thorough account of the writ of
habeas corpus in Georgia during the century after the Civil War,
from 1865 to 1965. When this period began, Georgia was in
ruins and on the verge of Reconstruction; when the period
ended, the state was prosperous and in the midst of a Second
Reconstruction. Part I of this Article examines the habeas
protections in the Georgia state constitutions of 1865, 1868, 1877,
and 1945. Part II explores the various Georgia habeas corpus
statutes enacted or in force at one time or another from 1865 to
1965. Part III reviews Georgia habeas corpus practice and
procedure during this same time period, and Part IV surveys the
Georgia habeas corpus case law during this period.
I. Georgia Habeas Corpus Constitutional Provisions
Between 1865 and 1965 Georgia adopted a total of four state
constitutions, each of which contained a provision in its bill of
rights protecting the writ of habeas corpus. The first two of these
constitutions permitted suspension of habeas corpus, while the
second two flatly prohibited it. The habeas provisions of the
1865 and 1868 constitutions each provided: "The writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or
invasion, the public safety may require it."4 The habeas provisions of the 1877 and 1945 constitutions, on the other hand,
each provided: "The writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended."' Thus, the writ of habeas corpus was a state constitutional
right in Georgia throughout the period 1865 to 1965, and except
for the first twelve years of this period, any suspension of the
state's writ was constitutionally barred.' At no time after the Civil
War was habeas corpus ever suspended in Georgia.
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IL. Georgia Habeas Corpus Statutory Provisions
A. Overview
The Georgia habeas corpus statutes that were adopted or in
operation at one time or another from 1865 to 1965 may be
divided into four categories. First, there were the various
provisions of the habeas chapter, article, or title of each of the
seven Georgia Codes-those of 1861, 1868, 1878, 1882, 1895,
1910, and 1933-in force during this period. Second, there were
the miscellaneous other habeas corpus provisions of these
Georgia Codes, located outside the habeas chapter, article, or
title of each Code. Third, there were the numerous pre-1933
uncodified statutes conferring habeas jurisdiction on various
courts and judges.7 Finally, there were the habeas corpus
statutes enacted from 1933 to 1965.
B. Georgia Code Habeas Provisions
The State of Georgia's first official code, the Georgia Code
of 1861, which was in effect from 1863 until 1868, "included a
habeas corpus chapter consisting of twenty-three sections which
comprehensively regulated habeas corpus proceedings at the trial
court level. The 1861 Code also included miscellaneous
additional habeas corpus sections scattered throughout other
portions of the Code."'
Like the 1861 Code, each of the six official Georgia Codes
adopted between 1868 and 1965-the Codes of 1868, 1873, 1882,
1895, 1910, and 1933-contained a habeas corpus chapter, article,
or title consisting of between twenty-three and twenty-seven
consecutive habeas statutory sections, most of which were derived
from the habeas chapter of the 1861 Code.' The post-1861
Codes, like the 1861 Code, each contained a number of other
habeas sections outside the habeas chapter, article, or title.
1. Habeas Chapter of 1868 Code
With twenty-three sections, the habeas corpus chapter of the
1868 Codeo was identical to the habeas chapter of the 1861
Code, except in two respects. First, a new Code section" was
enacted which codified the provisions of an 1863 statute"
authorizing a civil action against and the imposition of a
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monetary penalty of twenty-five hundred dollars on a judge who
in violation of his duty refused to issue a writ of habeas corpus.
Second, the 1868 Code abolished the habeas powers of the
justices of the inferior courts and transferred them to the county
courtjudges, while at the same time eliminating all references to
the previous habeas jurisdiction of justices of the inferior
courts.s The 1861 Code had vested power to grant writs of
habeas corpus in (1) the superior court judge of the circuit
where the detention existed, and (2) in the absence of the local
superior court judge, the justices of the inferior courts of the
county of detention."
The 1868 Code, on the other hand, vested habeas power in
(1) the superior court judge of the circuit where the detention
existed, and (2) the judge of the county court of the county
where the detention existed.' Where the 1861 Code required
that habeas proceedings be returned to and recorded by the
clerk of the superior or inferior court of the county in which the
habeas case was heard,16 the 1868 Code required that the
returning and recording be performed by the clerk of the
superior or county court." Where the justices of the inferior
court were barred by the 1861 Code from granting habeas relief
to persons imprisoned under final order or process of a superior
court," the 1868 Code made the bar applicable instead to the
judge of the county court." Furthermore, a habeas section of
the 1861 Code 20 requiring that a majority of the justices of an
inferior court hear the return to a writ of habeas corpus in cases
where the writ had been issued by a single justice was not
reenacted. The power given to county courts under the 1868
Code to issue habeas writs turned out to be illusory, because the
county courts were abolished by the 1868 state constitution2' on
the very day the 1868 Code took effect 22
2. Habeas Chapter of 1873 Code
With twenty-three sections, the habeas corpus chapter of the
1873 Code2" was identical to the habeas chapter of the 1868
Code, except in three respects. First, while vesting superior court
judges with the same power to issue habeas writs that they had
enjoyed under the 1868 Code, the 1873 Code stripped county
courts of habeas jurisdiction and vested it instead in the ordinary
of the county where the detention existed.24 The ordinary was,
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however, forbidden to issue habeas writs if the imprisoned person
was charged with a capital felony." Second, because ordinaries
instead of county judges now had habeas jurisdiction, a habeas
proceeding not heard by a superior court judge henceforth
would be returned to and recorded by the clerk of the court of
ordinary (rather than the county court clerk)." Third, two
provisions of a section of the 1868 Code-one barring county
courts from granting habeas relief to persons imprisoned under
order or process of a superior court, 7 the other barring habeas
relief for imprisoned debtors whose jail fees were unpaid"8 -were
not reenacted.
3. Habeas Chapter of 1882 Code
The habeas corpus chapter of the 1882 Code contained
twenty-three sections29 and was identical to the habeas chapter
of the 1873 Code.
4. Habeas Article of 1895 Code
Prior to 1895, each of the various Georgia Codes contained
a habeas chapter consisting of twenty-three consecutive statutory
sections located within the Code of Practice portion of the
particular Code. By contrast, the habeas portion of the 1895
Georgia Code consisted of twenty-six consecutive habeas sections
contained not in a chapter but in an article, which was located
not in a Code of Practice but in a Penal Code that had its own
numbered sections.s The habeas article of the 1895 Penal
Code was in most respects identical to the habeas chapter of the
1882 Code, but did make six changes.
First, the category of judges with power to grant a writ of
habeas corpus was expanded. In addition to superior court
judges and ordinaries, who continued to be vested with power to
issue the writ, the writ could now also be granted by a judge of
a city court established on recommendation of a grand jury."
Second, the power of ordinaries to grant a writ of habeas corpus
was trimmed; under the 1882 Code ordinaries had been barred
from issuing the writ only in capital cases, but they were now
additionally barred from issuing the writ in extradition cases.
Third, presumably because the 1877 state constitution prohibited
habeas corpus suspension, the provision of the 1882 Code3 3
permitting habeas suspension in time of war for persons in
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military custody was not reenacted. Fourth, apparently to
reinforce the 1877 constitutional ban on habeas suspension, a
new Code section was enacted which, in wording identical to the
constitutional provision, prohibited suspending habeas.' Fifth,
a second new Code section authorized superior courts to issue
writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum to compel the production
in court of legally imprisoned persons needed as witnesses."
Finally, a third new Code section was added when a Code section
of the habeas chapter of the 1882 Code was divided into two
Code sections in the habeas article of the 1895 Penal Code.s"
5. Habeas Article of 1910 Code
Like the 1895 Georgia Code, the 1910 Georgia Code
included a separately numbered Penal Code containing a habeas
article consisting of consecutive statutory sections. The habeas
article of the 1910 Penal Code was identical to the habeas article
of the 1895 Code, except that it contained twenty-seven rather
than twenty-six sections." The new Code section added in 1910
expedited appellate practice in the Georgia Supreme Court in
habeas cases. 8
6. Habeas Title of 1933 Code
The Georgia Code of 1933, which took effect on January 1,
1935,"1 consisted, unlike the previous Georgia Codes, of 114
alphabetically arranged separate titles. The writ of habeas corpus
was allocated an entire title in the new Code. The habeas article
of the 1910 Penal Code was incorporated en bloc into Title 50,
the habeas corpus title of the 1933 Code, except that (1) the
portion of the section of the 1910 Code40 vesting habeas power
in judges of city courts established on recommendation of a
grand jury was not reenacted, so that now only superior court
judges and ordinaries were empowered by the Georgia Code to
issue the writ; and (2) for unknown reasons the section of the
1910 Penal Code 4 1 forbidding suspension of habeas corpus was
not reenacted. The habeas title of the 1933 Code therefore
consisted of twenty-six rather than twenty-seven sections.
7. Other Code Habeas Provisions
Like the 1861 Georgia Code, each of the six Georgia Codes
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enacted from 1868 to 1933 contained at the time of adoption
various habeas statutory provisions outside its habeas corpus
chapter (or article or title). For example, there were eight
habeas sections in the 1868 Code that were not in the habeas
corpus chapter," and seven of the 1933 Code's habeas sections
were not in Title 50."
C. Pre-1933 Uncodified Statutes Conferring Habeas
Jurisdiction
Under the Georgia Code of 1861 and the six Georgia Codes
adopted between 1868 and 1933, habeas corpus jurisdiction was
vested in these judges or courts during the following time
periods:
Superior court judges, 1865-1965;
Inferior court judges, 1865-1868;
County courts, 1868 (this jurisdiction never became operative);45

Ordinaries, 1873-1965;"
Judges of city courts established on grand jury recommendation, 1895-1933.<
These, however, were not the only Georgia courts or judges
authorized to issue writs of habeas corpus at various times
between 1865 and 1933. During the century after the Civil War,
at one time or another, miscellaneous uncodified statutory
provisions bestowed habeas jurisdiction on various other courts
or judges, including:
Judges of district courts;"
Judges of the "new" (post-1872) county courts;-,
Judges of city courts established by a special statute;50
Judges of various other localized state courts."
D. Post-1933 Habeas Statutes
After the adoption of the 1933 Code but prior to 1965, a
total of five Georgia habeas corpus statutes were enacted.
1. 1951 Legislation
In 1951, the Georgia legislature enacted the Juvenile Court
Act, 3 which provided in part that "[c]ourts of record handling
...

habeas corpus cases involving the custody of a child or
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children may transfer the question of the determination of
custody . . . to the juvenile court for investigation and report
back to the superior court or for investigation and determination.""

The same year the Georgia legislature passed the

Uniform Criminal Extradition Act,55 one section of which
secured the habeas rights of a person arrested under the Act by
providing that if the person brought before a judge "desires to
test the legality of his arrest, thejudge .. . shall fix a reasonable

time to be be allowed him within which to apply for a writ of
habeas corpus."" Another section provided that the arrestee
could in the presence of a judge waive the extradition proceedings against him after the judge first, among other things,
"inform [ed] such person of his right[] to obtain a writ of habeas
corpus ..... "7
2. 1956 Legislation
A 1956 statute" amended the 1933 Code so as to change
the amount of time the respondent had to make his return in a
habeas proceeding. Previously, the return time in all habeas
proceedings had been twenty days. Under the 1956 statute, the
return time remained twenty days, except that it was shortened
to eight days in cases of criminal imprisonment.59
3. 1958 Legislation
Two years later a statute authorizing involuntary commitment of mentally ill persons was enacted," a section of which
protected the habeas rights of committed persons by providing
that any person "detained pursuant to this Act shall be entitled
to the writ of habeas corpus

"61

4. 1964 Legislation
Six years later the Georgia Health Code Act,62 among other
things, added a new section" to the 1933 Code regulating
habeas corpus proceedings instituted on behalf of persons
hospitalized and confined by order of the Department of Health,
and providing for the discharge of a committed person if further
detention was not required."
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III. Georgia Habeas Practice and Procedure
A. Trial Court Level Proceedings
A 1903 Georgia Supreme Court habeas decision, Simmons v.
Georgia Iron & Coal Co.," is the single most important decision
of the era with regard to the proper procedures to be followed
in Georgia habeas proceedings at the trial court level. A habeas
corpus proceeding at the trial court level-typically heard by a
superior court judge, a city court judge, or an ordinary-was
commenced by the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. Such a proceeding, according to the Georgia Supreme
Court, "was a summary application by the person detained,"6 6
and "was, strictly speaking, neither a civil nor a criminal action."" Except in child custody cases, habeas petitions could
not properly be filed unless the person in whose behalf relief was
sought was restrained of his liberty-that is, unless he was a
prisoner or was otherwise in physical custody.
Each of the seven Georgia Codes adopted from 1861 to 1933
included a section providing that a habeas petition could be filed
by "[a]ny person restrained of his liberty under any pretext
whatever ..... " The habeas petition could therefore-and this
was usually was the case-be filed by an imprisoned person acting
by himself or through his attorney. That same Code section
also provided that a habeas petition could be filed by "any person
alleging that another, in whom for any cause he is interested, is
restrained of his liberty . . . . "7 This statutory language
permitting a third-party to file a habeas petition in behalf of a
prisoner was generously construed by the Georgia Supreme
Court. "Any person," the Court said, "may petition for the writ
of habeas corpus in behalf of one imprisoned .

. .

. Interest

arising from humanity alone comes within both letter and spirit
of the section."'
Georgia was more accepting of third-party
habeas petitions than some other American jurisdictions. In the
federal system, for example, unlike Georgia, third-party habeas
petitions "[were] by no means granted automatically to whomever seeks to pursue [a habeas] action on behalf of another."7 2
Nearly all the reported third-party habeas litigation in Georgia
was instituted by the prisoner's spouse 7 or by a close blood
relative."
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The plaintiff in a Georgia habeas corpus proceeding-the
person in whose behalf the relief was sought-was the "petitioner,"
and the defendant was the "respondent." In almost all the
reported Georgia habeas litigation, child custody cases excepted,
the habeas petitioner was a prisoner in the custody of a state or
local law enforcement official and imprisoned in a state, county,
or local detention facility. It was improper in such cases for the
petitioner to name the State of Georgia or a local governmental
entity as the respondent, although this sometimes occurred."
The proper practice was to designate the immediate custodian-the official in charge of the institution where the petitioner
was detained-as the respondent. This was usually a law enforcement or detention facility official. The prison warden would be
named as the respondent if the habeas petitioner was incarcerated in a state prison;76 the superintendent or warden of the
chain gang, if the petitioner was on a chain gang;" the sheriff,
if the petitioner was confined in a county jail;7 1 the chief of
police, if the petitioner was detained in a city jail or a police
station.7 9
By statute the habeas petition was required to be filed with
a habeas judge having territorial jurisdiction over the place where
the petitioner was restrained of his liberty, which meant that the
petitioner had to be detained within the geographical limits of
the court over which the habeas judge presided."o If the
petition was submitted to a superior court judge, the petitioner
had to be detained in one of the counties within the judge's
circuit." If the petition was submitted to an ordinary, the
petitioner had to be detained in the county of the court of
ordinary over which the ordinary presided." If the petition was
submitted to a judge of a city court established on grand jury
recommendation, the petitioner had to be detained within the
territorial limits of the county in which the city court was
located." If the petition was submitted to a judge of a city
court created by special statute, the petitioner had to be detained
within the territorial limits of the county or portion of the county
over which the city court had jurisdiction."
The habeas petition had to be in writing and under
oath,8 6 and it had to be "signed by the applicant, his attorney or
agent, or some other person in his behalf . . . . "I The
petition had to state: (1) "[t]he name or description of the
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person whose liberty is restrained;" (2) "[t]he person restraining,
the mode of restraint, and the place of detention, as nearly as
practicable;" (3) "[(t] he cause or pretense of the restraint; and if
under pretext of legal process, a copy of the process, if within the
power of the applicant, must be annexed to the petition;" (4)
"[a] distinct averment of the alleged illegality in the restraint or
other reason why the writ of habeas corpus is sought;" and (5)
"[a] prayer for the writ of habeas corpus.""
In reviewing the habeas petition for facial sufficiency, the
habeas judge was "not [to] be too astute in finding technical
objections to the manner in which the legality of the restraint is
called in question,"" and the review was "not to be dissipated
by subtle objections and technical niceties."so If it was apparent
from the habeas petition itself that the petitioner's alleged
detention was legal (or that he was not detained), the habeas
judge would refuse to issue the habeas writ, deny the petition,
and dismiss the proceeding." If it fairly appeared from the face
of the habeas petition that the detention complained of was
illegal, the judge was required to issue the writ of habeas
corpus." A model form of writ of habeas corpus was prescribed
by statute." The writ required the respondent, at the date and
time specified in the writ, to produce the body of the person
allegedly illegally detained, together with the cause of the
detention. The writ would be served by delivering a copy of the
writ to the respondent, and any citizen could make the service. 94
Disobedience of the writ was contempt of court.95
The respondent's return to the writ had to be made within
twenty days of the filing of the habeas petition." The return
had to be under oath, and the body of the restrained person had
to be produced in court." If the return denied material facts
alleged in the habeas petition, or alleged other facts upon which
issue was taken, the judge could in a summary manner hear
testimony as to the issue and compel the attendance of witnesses
If the petitioner was
or the production of documents."
charged with crime and the solicitor general (i.e., district
attorney) was in the county, he was to be notified of the hearing.99 At the hearing on the return to the writ, the respondent
was permitted to demur to the habeas petition, and if it then
appeared to the judge that the habeas petition on its face failed
make an adequate showing that the petitioner was illegally
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restrained of his liberty, the judge could dismiss or quash the writ
and remand the petitioner to custody. 00
Under statute, the habeas petitioner could not be granted
relief if (1) he was imprisoned under lawful process except where
bail was allowed and properly tendered; (2) the defect in the
warrant of commitment was technical; (3) he was imprisoned
under a bench warrant valid on its face; (4) the court was
satisfied that the habeas petitioner was the person charged in a
criminal warrant, despite any misnomer in the warrant; (5) the
petitioner was in custody for contempt and the committing court
had not exceeded itsjurisdiction in the length of imprisonment;
or (6) the detention of the petitioner was otherwise authorized
by law.'o' Nor could the petitioner be discharged from custody
on criminal charges by reason of any defect in the affidavit,
warrant, or commitment if there was probable cause for his
detention.10 2 If the petitioner had been arrested on reasonable
suspicion of committing a crime in another state, he could not
be discharged until there had been sufficient time for the other
state to demand his extradition.'
In all other cases, the judge
was to "discharge, remand or admit the party to bail, or deliver
him to the custody of the officer or person entitled thereto, as
the principles of law and justice may require.""
If relief was
denied, the judge would remand the habeas petitioner to
custody.'
If the issue was bail and the judge granted relief,
bail would be fixed or the amount of bail reduced.o If the
judge granted habeas relief to a petitioner entitled to release, the
habeas petitioner would be discharged from custody. 0 7 Such
a petitioner could not "lawfully be again arrested, imprisoned,
restrained, or kept in custody for the same cause, or under the
same sentence."" However, he could be remanded to custody
on other grounds if there were separate, valid reasons for
detaining him, as where there was an outstanding arrest warrant
on other charges pending against him."o
B. Appellate Review
The final decision of the judge in a Georgia habeas corpus
proceeding at the trial court level was subject to appellate review,
irrespective of whether relief was denied or granted. The habeas
petitioner could obtain appellate review of a decision denying
relief,"0 and the habeas respondent could obtain appellate
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review of a decision granting relief..' The final decision of a
superior court judge in a habeas proceeding was directly
reviewable of right via the writ of error in the Georgia Supreme
Court."2 The final decision of an ordinary in a habeas case
was subject to appellate review via the writ of certiorari in the
local superior court, and the superior court's decision was
directly reviewable of right via the writ of error in the Georgia
Supreme Court."' Similarly, the final decision of a county
judge in a habeas case was reviewable in the local superior court
via the writ of certiorari, with the superior court's decision
directly reviewable of right via the writ of error in the Georgia
Supreme Court.'1 4
Appellate review of final decisions of city courts (and city
courtjudges) was governed by Georgia Supreme Court decisions
construing the provisions of the 1868 and 1877 Georgia state
constitutions, as well as various Georgia statutes, relating to writs
of error."' Under these decisions, if the habeas judge presided
over a city court created on recommendation of a grand jury, his
decision was subject to appellate review via the writ of certiorari
in the local superior court, and the decision of the superior court
was directly reviewable of right via the writ of error in the
Georgia Supreme Court."' If the habeas judge presided over
a city court created by statute, the available appellate review
depended on whether the court was a "constitutional city
court."" 7 If it was, then the habeas decision was directly
reviewable of right via the writ of error in the Georgia Supreme
Court."' On the other hand, if the habeas judge presided over
a city court that was established by special statute but was not a
constitutional city court, then the decision was subject to
appellate review via the writ of certiorari in the local superior
court, with the decision of the superior court directly reviewable
of right via the writ of error in the Georgia Supreme Court." 9
C. Res Judicata
Three Georgia Supreme Court decisions, spread over a
period of half a century, were required before there was final
resolution of the issue of whether the doctrine of res judicata
extended to Georgia habeas decisions. In Perry v. McLendon,20
an 1879 case involving imprisonment under civil process, the
Court held that where the two persons petitioning for a writ of
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habeas corpus had previously been denied habeas relief based on
the same claims, the prior determination was conclusive.12'
This holding marked a departure from the common law rule,
under which res judicata did not apply to a decision denying
habeas relief. 22 The Court's reasoning was that Georgia habeas
decisions, unlike those at common law, were subject to appellate
review."
In 1927, in Pryor v. Pryor,124 resjudicata was held applicable
to child custody habeas proceedings.
In 1931, in Day v. Smith,125 the Court completed its gradual
extension of res judicata to habeas corpus cases by holding that
habeas proceedings involving criminal imprisonment were
governed by res judicata principles. In a prior, unappealed
habeas proceeding, an ordinary had granted the petitioner, who
had been convicted in superior court, habeas relief from several
criminal sentences imposed in superior court which the ordinary
determined were void. The grant of habeas relief was not
appealed. Thereafter, amazingly, the successful habeas petitioner
was rearrested and once again imprisoned under the same void
sentences from which he had been discharged in the habeas
proceeding. He promptly filed a second habeas petition, this
time with a superior court judge, who dismissed the petition.
The habeas petitioner then appealed directly via the writ of error
to the Georgia Supreme Court, which, perceiving no reason why
res judicata should not apply to habeas decisions in criminal
cases to the same extent it applied in civil cases, reversed and
ordered the petitioner discharged from custody under the void
sentences.126
Under these decisions, it became a fixed principle that res
judicata extended to all habeas corpus proceedings in Georgia.
If the habeas petitioner had previously been denied
habeas relief, he would be remanded to custody if his subsequent
habeas petition Ittacked the same imprisonment and raised the
same claims;" if he had been discharged from custody on his
prior petition but for some reason later returned to that same
custody, he would be released."2
Although the doctrine of res judicata did extend to habeas
decisions in child custody cases, it was applied somewhat
differently. The doctrine barred relitigation, but only based on
the same facts.'" Successive habeas proceedings between the
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same parties to relitigate a child custody issue were permissible
if there had been a change of circumstances since the previous
habeas proceeding."s'
IV. Georgia Habeas Case Law
A. Child Custody Cases
1. Generally
During the century following the end of the Civil War,
perhaps a quarter of the habeas cases decided by the Georgia

Supreme Court were child custody cases, where the issue for
determination was who was entitled to the custody of a minor
child, not whether a prisoner was unlawfully incarcerated. 2
During that century the habeas chapter, article, or title of each
of the Georgia Codes included a section which provided that the
habeas judge in a child custody case had discretion as to whom
the custody should be given and could grant custody to someone
other than the father or mother."' Various other statutes
enacted during this period also governed the disposition of child
custody habeas cases. 3 4
In child custody cases, the habeas proceeding usually was
instituted by the child's father, mother, grandparent or some
other relative,"' and habeas proceedings in which divorced or
separated parents fought one another tenaciously over custody of
their child were common.13 6 Occasionally the habeas case
would involve a child born out of wedlock. 3 7 Most child

custody habeas cases were filed with a superior court judge,'s
but many were filed with a city court judge'"' or an ordinary."
The proper venue for filing a habeas petition in a
child custody case was the county of residence of the person
allegedly in possession of the child, irrespective of the location of
the child.' (or the location of the residence of the child's legal
custodian if there was one).
Although Georgia in 1845 abolished the common law rule
vesting the custody of minor children in habeas cases always in
the father,"' until 1913-when it was statutorily abolished'13-the Georgia courts adhered to a related rule under
which prima facie the right to custody of a child belonged to the
father.'" The 1913 statute, however, did no more than place
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the parents on an equal footing, and did not prevent courts from
holding that a parent or the parents were prima facie entitled to
the custody of their child in a controversy with some other
person seeking custody of the child.'4
After 1913, the master rule in a Georgia child custody habeas
proceeding in which divorced or separated parents each sought
custody was that the court
may exercise its sound discretion, taking into consideration all the
circumstances of the case

...

the duty of the court being

...

in

exercising such discretion, to look to and determine solely what is for the
best interest of the child or children, and what will promote their welfare
and happiness, and make awards accordingly.1"

The final judgment-that is, an unappealed judgment or a
judgment upheld on appellate review-awarding custody of a child
in a habeas case was binding on the parties and res judicata."
However, "[w]hile judgments in habeas-corpus proceedings
instituted by parents to secure the custody of their minor
children are conclusive upon them, such conclusiveness relates
to the status existing at the time of the rendition of such
judgments. Change of status may authorize a differentjudgment
in a subsequent [habeas] proceeding."'"
Successive habeas
proceedings involving the same parties and the same child were
therefore permitted if, since the prior habeas proceeding, there
had been a change of circumstances warranting a fresh determination of the child custody issue. 4 9

2. Child Apprentices
In the decade following the Civil War the Georgia Supreme
Court handed down six notable child custody habeas decisions"o which merit special mention because they involved
children who, pursuant to an 1866 statute,1"' had been bound
out as apprentices. Under the statute, children could be bound
out as apprentices (1) with parental consent, or (2) if they were
orphans or their parents were unable to support them, by order
of an ordinary or a county judge. In at least five of the cases the
child was African-American, and in all six cases the child was
released from the apprenticeship and returned to a parent
because the procedures by which the child had been bound out
were tainted by fraud, overreaching, or illegality. In these cases
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the Georgia Supreme Court, while sympathetic to the good
intentions behind the statute,5 2 exhibited a laudable determination to stop in its tracks subtle endeavors to use the apprenticeship law as a method of reverting to the evils of black slavery.'1
B. Civil Imprisonment Cases
Some of the habeas litigation involved civil imprisonment.
Persons imprisoned pursuant to an adjudication of civil contemptl54 sometimes sought habeas relief 15 Relief was rarely
granted, however, because it was available only if the court
ordering the imprisonment lacked jurisdiction to commit for civil
contempt, which was unlikely.5 5 There were a few habeas cases
involving (1) material witnesses imprisoned to ensure their
appearance at an upcoming grand jury proceeding" or criminal trial; 5 (2) persons imprisoned pursuant to peace warrantl59 or bastardy16 proceedings; and (3) persons detained
on mental health grounds.'
Following Georgia's abolition of imprisonment for debt in
the second half of the nineteenth century,162 the likelihood
that persons would be imprisoned pursuant to civil process issued
as part of a traditional common law civil action was reduced but
not eliminated. Various forms of civil arrest process continued
to exist. Between 1863 and 1933, each of the Georgia Codes
contained a section authorizing pretrial imprisonment under civil
process of defendants in civil actions for the recovery of personalty." Under these provisions, if the personal property sought
to be recovered could not be found, a defendant who failed to
produce the property and who failed to make bail pending the
action could be imprisoned." As a result, there were habeas
proceedings instituted on behalf of defendants in bail trover
actions who had been imprisoned under civil process for failing
to produce the personal property at issue or to give bail. 16
The courts rejected claims that such civil imprisonment constituted imprisonment for debt,'" and held that proof that the
defendant was unable to produce the property did not authorize
the granting of habeas relief." All these habeas proceedings
were unsuccessful.
Furthermore, after passage of an 1878 act," which created
a statutory procedure in the nature of habeas corpus by which a
civil defendant who had been imprisoned for failing to produce
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personal property and was unable to make bail could petition the
trial court and under some circumstances be released on his own
recognizance, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the statutory
procedure had to be invoked before a habeas petition could be
filed." If the statutory procedure was invoked unsuccessfully,
a subsequent habeas petition was barred."o If the statutory
procedure was successful, of course, resort to habeas corpus
became unnecessary.
Another form of civil imprisonment provided for under each
of the Georgia Codes from 1863 to 1933 was in regard to
possessory warrant civil actions.'71 Under some circumstances,
the defendant in a possessory warrant action could be imprisoned
under civil process if he failed to produce the property at
issue."'7 Imprisonment under such civil process was sometimes
attacked via habeas corpus.1s
C. Extradition Cases
In Georgia, as in every state, the writ of habeas corpus
traditionally has been the state court remedy invoked by arrested
persons seeking to avoid criminal extradition to another state.7
And in Georgia, as in the other states, " [t] he traditional scope of
review in extradition habeas cases [has been] narrow."" From
1865 to 1951, the extent to which Georgia habeas relief was
available to prevent a prisoner from being extradited to another
state was governed by (1) 18 U.S.C. § 3182, the federal statute
which, because the U.S. Constitution's Extradition Clause 76 is
not self-executing, implements the Clause by establishing a
procedure pursuant to which any person who is a "fugitive from
justice" under the statute may be extradited from one state to
another state;' 77 (2) four consecutive Georgia Code sections
which supplemented the federal statute by imposing duties on
the governor and state law enforcement officials in regard to the
extradition of persons from Georgia to another state;178 and (3)
another Code section, located in the habeas corpus chapter,
article, or title, which, with respect to a person arrested on
reasonable suspicion for committing a crime in another state,
prohibited the arrestee's release on habeas corpus "until a
sufficient time shall be given for a demand to be made on the
Governor for his rendition."' Although some of the Georgia
habeas extradition litigation involved claims arising under the five
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Georgia statutes, most of it focused on whether the procedure
prescribed by the federal statute had been violated.
During this period of more than three-quarters of a century,
the Georgia courts, like the courts of most states," rarely
granted habeas relief from extradition. The Georgia Supreme
Court held that a person whose extradition to another state was
sought could not use habeas corpus to assert his innocence' 8
or to question the motives of those filing the charges against him
in the demanding state.' 82 The court rejected suggestions that
the term fugitive from justice be given a narrow, technical definition.'a Nor would the court permit habeas to be used to
attack irregularities in the governor's extradition arrest warrant'" or defects in form in the indictment or affidavits filed
against the fugitive in the demanding state." A facially valid
extradition arrest warrant issued by the governor was presumed
to be valid, and the burden was on the habeas petitioner to show
some good reason why the extradition should not take place."as
However, an arrestee would be released from custody in a
Georgia habeas proceeding if the extradition request did not
comply with the requirements of the federal extradition statute.
Under Hyatt v. New York ex rel. Corkran,"' for example, a 1903
U.S. Supreme Court decision construing that statute, a person
was deemed not to be a "fugitive from justice" within the
coverage of the statute if it was beyond dispute that he was not
in the demanding state when, if ever, the alleged crime was
committed there. In 1920 the Georgia Supreme Court granted
habeas relief based on Hyatt."
In 1942 the court granted
habeas relief where the extradition request was based on an
affidavit which had been sworn to in the demanding state before
a notary public rather than, as required by the federal statute, a
"magistrate.""'
In 1951," the Georgia legislature enacted the Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act."9' The Uniform Act established a
modernized procedure for extraditing persons from Georgia to
another state, and could be used in place of the federal extradition statute.'" Under the Act, no matter what issues previously
had been cognizable in Georgia extradition habeas cases, habeas
review was now strictly limited to four issues: (1) whether the
arrestee was the person named in the extradition warrant; (2)
whether the arrestee was a fugitive; (3) whether the demand for
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extradition was in due form; and (4) whether there was a
substantial charge of crime."'
After the 1951 adoption of the Uniform Act, which simplified and expedited the extradition process, the Georgia Supreme
Court was not inclined to retreat from its previous rulings making
habeas relief from a proposed extradition unlikely."' Surprisingly, however, until the early 1960s there continued to be
habeas cases where extradition was sought under the federal
extradition statute rather than the Uniform Act, and where the
court granted relief which might not have been issued if the
Uniform Act had been used.'95
D. Road Court Cases
There used to be a time when under state law some
Georgians-"road defaulters"'"-could be imprisoned, even
placed on the chain gang, for failing to work on the public roads.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Georgia,
"there [were] three distinct general systems for working public
roads."" The original system, known as the "stick and dirt"
system,"98 originated in the Georgia Code of 1861;1" the second system, known as the "alternative road law,"" was created
by an 1891 statute;20 ' and the third system, the "four-day road
law,"202 was created by a statute enacted in 1896.20s Under
the first two of these systems, a male who had reached a certain
age could, under some circumstances, be imprisoned if without
satisfactory explanation he defaulted on his statutory obligation
to perform designated work on the public roads of his county of
residence.2 " Under the "dirt and stick" system, males between
the age of sixteen and fifty could be sentenced to imprisonment,
while under the "alternative road law" males aged between
twenty-one and fifty could be sentenced to serve up to ninety
days on the chain gang.205 The trial of an alleged defaulter
would be held before a local board of road commissioners sitting
as a road court. Between 1883 and 1933, there were five
reported Georgia appellate court habeas decisions involving
persons imprisoned after having been convicted and sentenced
in a road court.2' Habeas relief was available only on grounds
the conviction or the sentence was void for lack of jurisdiction,2 07 and in none of the five cases was habeas relief granted.
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E. Criminal Imprisonment Cases: Criminal Contempt
Persons imprisoned for criminal contempt could apply for
a writ of habeas corpus, but relief would be granted only if the
court ordering the imprisonment lacked jurisdiction, 208 or if
the sentence of imprisonment was unreasonable and excessive as
a matter of law.2' This was in accordance with a Code section
in the habeas chapter, article, or title of the Georgia Codes from
1861 to 1933.210

F. Criminal Imprisonment Cases: Bail
Habeas corpus could be used to obtain release on bail by
persons in pretrial custody on criminal charges. Under Georgia
statutes, as construed by the Georgia Supreme Court, prior to
conviction all crimes except capital offenses were bailable of
right,211 and this right to pretrial bail was reenforced by the
state constitutional prohibition on excessive bail.212 Since
"[e]xcessive bail is the equivalent of a refusal to grant bail ...
in such a case habeas corpus [was] an available and appropriate
remedy for relief."' However, it was also true that "according
to our practice and procedure, the amount of bail to be assessed
in each criminal case is left to the sound legal discretion of the
court required to fix it and, in the absence of a flagrant abuse of
such discretionary power, his action will not be controlled.""
Habeas corpus petitions seeking reduction of bail were, therefore, frequently unsuccessful.1 Under Georgia law, there was
no right to bail after conviction in a felony case. 1 In misdemeanor cases there was a right to bail after conviction and
pending appeal.1 If the bail set pending appeal for a person
convicted of misdemeanor was excessive, it could be reduced in
a habeas proceeding.
G. Criminal Imprisonment Cases: Pretrial
It was not uncommon for persons imprisoned on criminal
charges and awaiting trial to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in
an effort to obtain release from custody and dismissal of the
charges. The Georgia Supreme Court took a dim view of
this. 1 Its attitude was that habeas corpus was "not designed to
interrupt the orderly administration of law by a court of compe-
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tent authority acting within its jurisdiction. "220 Nor was it "the
function of the writ of habeas corpus ...

to determine the guilt

or innocence of one accused of crime."22'
With very few
2 22
exceptions, the court relentlessly rebuffed attempts by criminal defendants to use habeas to prevent or preempt an upcoming
criminal trial.22' The court crushed efforts by pretrial defendants to use habeas to attack defects or irregularities in the
commitment proceedings.2 2 ' The court positively refused to
permit pretrial habeas corpus to be used to prove the defendant's innocence 2 5 or to assert a defense to the charges.
The court would, however, permit a defendant in pretrial custody
to use habeas corpus to attack the constitutionality of the statute,
or the validity of the ordinance, defining the offense he was
charged with committing.227
H. Criminal Imprisonment Cases: Postconviction
Postconviction habeas corpus proceedings are perhaps the
most fascinating of all habeas proceedings. A postconviction
habeas corpus proceeding is a habeas case brought in behalf of
a person convicted of violating a criminal statute or a penal
ordinance and sentenced to imprisonment or other custody,
where the convicted person seeks relief on grounds the conviction or the sentence is invalid.2 28 Traditionally, postconviction
habeas corpus relief usually has been granted in the federal
courts or in the state courts, including Georgia courts, only on
either jurisdictional grounds or constitutional grounds-that is,
only if the defect in the conviction or the sentence is either
jurisdictional in nature or involves a violation of a constitutional
right.
During the period 1865 to 1965 postconviction habeas relief
was infrequently granted in Georgia.2 " The grounds for relief
were few in number and narrow in scope. In addition, various
procedural rules could prevent the granting of postconviction
relief, even if the habeas petition raised arguably meritorious
claims. But there were cognizable habeas claims, and sometimes
relief would be granted. Habeas relief granted on grounds
involving the invalidity of the conviction usually would consist of
either discharge from custody2" or, if the defendant was
subject to retrial or there was a pending warrant against him, a
remand to the custody of the proper law enforcement offi-

GEORGIA HABEAS CORPUS

255

cial.si Where the conviction was valid but relief was granted
on grounds involving the invalidity of the sentence, the defendant, unless the sentence had been fully served, would be
remanded in custody to the convicting court for resentencing."3 It was well established that either a city court judge or
(except in capital cases) an ordinary could grant postconviction
habeas relief even though the conviction had occurred in
superior court. 33
1. jurisdictional Groundsfor Relief
Under what has been termed the "voidness requirement,"2 postconviction habeas corpus relief usually was available in Georgia only if the conviction or sentence was void
because the convicting court had acted without jurisdiction or
had exceeded its jurisdiction in the premises." A convicting
court acted withoutjurisdiction if the conviction was void for lack
of either personal or subject matterjurisdiction, and a convicting
court exceeded its jurisdiction in the premises if it imposed a
void sentence-that is, a sentence ordering infliction of an illegal
or unauthorized punishment. 2ss
(a) Void Convictions: Lack ofPersonaljurisdiction.Although the
Georgia Supreme Court proclaimed that habeas relief was
available if a conviction was void for want of in personam
jurisdiction,'
there are no known cases where relief was
actually granted based on a claim of lack of personal jurisdiction.
There is an explanation. First, jurisdiction over the person of a
criminal defendant is acquired merely by arresting him (whether
lawfully or unlawfully), and therefore it is extremely unlikely that
a defendant will be convicted without the trial court having first
secured personal jurisdiction.2 3 8 Second, for purposes of
habeas corpus a claim of lack of personal jurisdiction is deemed
waived if it was not timely asserted in the convicting court or
raised on direct review. 29
(b) Void Convictions: Lack of Subject MatterJurisdiction. While
habeas relief based lack of personal jurisdiction was mostly a
theoretical possibility, habeas relief based on lack of subject
matter jurisdiction was not. There were several dozen decisions
between 1865 and 1965 in which habeas relief was granted on
grounds the conviction was void for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Under case law, a conviction would be deemed void
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for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and habeas corpus relief
could be granted, under the following circumstances: (1) the
convicting court lacked authority to convict the habeas petitioner
because the offense charged was not within the class of offenses
the convicting court had lawful jurisdiction to try; (2) the
statute defining the offense charged was unconstitutional241 or
had been repealed,4 or the ordinance defining the offense
was void; 24 s (3) the indictment or accusation alleged acts which
were not criminal or otherwise failed to charge an offense;2W
(4) the habeas petitioner's criminal trial had been presided over
by an unauthorized judge, as where in a municipal court the
judge was a "mere usurper,"21 or where in a trial in superior
court the proceeding was presided over by ajudge of a city court
created on recommendation of a grand jury;2 1 or (5) the
habeas petitioner had been convicted of a felony without having
been indicted by a grand jury and without having validly waived
indictment, as where the waiver of indictment had been oral
rather than (as required by statute) in writing,24" or where the
habeas petitioner had waived indictment to a capital crime (even
though waiver of indictment was statutorily authorized only for
noncapital offenses).2

(c) Void Sentences. Even though the conviction itself was valid,
habeas relief was available if the sentence was void because the
convicting court had exceeded its jurisdiction in imposing it, as
where the sentence ordered a punishment that was in excess of
the statutory maximum for the offense of conviction,4 or
where the sentence was otherwise contrary to the applicable
sentencing statute.2 M
2. ConstitutionalGroundsfor Relief
(a) UnconstitutionalConvictions. At first, the Georgia courts
took the position that violations of constitutional rights occurring
in the proceedings resulting in the conviction and sentence were
not grounds for postconviction habeas corpus relief.2 ' Thus,
claims that in violation of due process an involuntary confession
had been admitted at the defendant's trial 2 or that in violation of equal protection there had been invidious discrimination
in the selection of the grand jury that indicted the defendant or
the petit jury that tried him, 25 3 were not regarded as cognizable in habeas corpus. The reasoning was that claims of violations

GEORGIA HABEAS CoRPus

257

of constitutional rights had to be raised at trial and on direct
review via the writ of error or writ of certiorari, and, if they had
not been, they were to be deemed waived for purposes of habeas
corpus.'"
In 1939, in response to United States Supreme Court
decisions expanding the federal writ of habeas corpus in
postconviction cases, the Georgia Supreme Court began to
modify its views on using habeas to litigate infringements of
constitutional rights, at least in regard to the constitutional right
to counsel.2 55 In Aldredge v. Williams,25' a death sentence case,
the Court, instead of repeating its usual mantra that habeas
corpus was limited to correcting void convictions and sentences,
startlingly proclaimed:
A discharge under a writ of habeas corpus, after conviction, cannot be
granted unless the judgment is absolutely void; as where the convicting
court was without jurisdiction, or where the defendant in his trial was denied
due process of law, in violation of the Federalfourteenth amendment ... and the
State constitution.217

This passage in Aldredge, in which the Georgia's highest court for
the first time acknowledged the availability of state habeas to
redress violations of constitutional rights occurring at trial,
echoed a passage in a United States Supreme Court habeas
decision earlier that year.258 The Georgia Supreme Court
mentioned but did not discuss the possibility that a violation of
the right to counsel might render the judgment of conviction
void." On the merits, however, the court rejected the habeas
petitioner's claim that had received ineffective assistance of
counsel at his capital trial, reversing the superior court judge's
order granting relief."*
21
Two years later, in 1941, in Wilcoxon v. Aldredge,"
another
death sentence case, the Georgia Supreme Court went further
and after extensive discussion squarely held that a violation of the
right to counsel was a fundamental legal error that stripped the
convicting court of jurisdiction and rendered the resulting
conviction void, and hence a right to counsel claim was cognizable in a habeas proceeding.2 2 The decision was heavily influenced by a noted 1938 United States Supreme Court decision,
Johnson v. Zerbst,263 in which the Court granted habeas relief to
a federal prisoner tried and convicted without the benefit or
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waiver of counsel, and announced that a "court's jurisdiction
...

may be lost" due to a violation of the constitutional right to

counsel, and that denial of the right to counsel "stands as a
jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence ."2" The
Georgia Supreme Court not only expressed its support for the
holding in Johnson v. Zerbst ("we consider the ruling sound"e2 ),
but proceeded to expand it.266 Johnson involved a denial of
counsel; the defendant had not been represented at his trial.
Wilcoxon involved a defendant who been represented at his trial
but now claimed his attorney was ineffective. Going beyond the
United States Supreme Court, the Georgia Supreme Court held
that either a denial of counsel or a violation of the right to the
effective assistance of counsel would render a conviction void for
lack of jurisdiction and authorize postconviction habeas corpus
relief.
Beginning in 1941, therefore, a violation of the constitutional right to counsel was a ground for state habeas relief in
Georgia, on the theory that the constitutional violation was a
jurisdictional error that rendered the conviction void. In the
1960s there were a modest number of cases where Georgia
habeas relief was granted based on a violation of the right to
counsel."6 In some of these cases nothing was said about any
lack of jurisdiction or about the conviction being void, relief
apparently being granted solely on account of the violation of a
constitutional right.2" All the cases where relief was granted
involved an actual denial of counsel. From 1941 to 1965 no one
was granted Georgia habeas relief based on an ineffective counsel
claim, presumably because the right to effective counsel was so
narrow in scope at the time.2' After 1941, the Georgia courts
continued to adhere to the rule that claims of violations of rights
not raised at trial or on direct review were waived and could not
be presented in habeas proceedings.27 0 Claims of violations of
the right to counsel were exempted from the waiver rule, because
they could not have been so raised.
(b) Unconstitutional Sentences. Even though the conviction

itself might be valid, postconviction habeas relief was nonetheless
available if the sentence was unconstitutional-that is, violated a
constitutional right, including the Georgia state constitutional
right to due process. The leading case was Pearson v. Wimbish," where relief was granted to a habeas petitioner who had
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been convicted in a municipal court of violating a municipal
ordinance prohibiting drunk and disorderly conduct and (as was
authorized by the state statute creating the municipal court)
sentenced to the chain gang. While sentencing the petitioner to
imprisonment would have been perfectly legal, the Georgia
Supreme Court held, sentencing him to the chain gang violated
due process. Leaving the underlying conviction undisturbed, the
Court ordered the defendant resentenced, explaining that
[p]rocess which tries a man without formality for a "petty offense," and
punishes him in the same manner as, and along with, criminals violating
the laws of the state, with no right to a jury trial, no record save the
entries upon a recorder's docket, and upon his judgment alone, is not
2m
due process.

3. Procedural Obstacles to Relief
Five procedural rules might operate to prevent the granting
of postconviction relief habeas even though the habeas petition
raised a possibly meritorious claim. First, there was the waiver of
constitutional rights doctrine, under which a violation of a
constitutional right was deemed waived for purposes of habeas
corpus if it had not been raised at trial and on direct review."'
Second, since the resjudicata doctrine applied to Georgia habeas
proceedings, 7 the doctrine barred a postconviction habeas
petition raising a claim rejected in a prior Georgia habeas
proceeding brought by the same habeas petitioner.'76 Res
judicata also barred a postconviction habeas petition which raised
a claim previously raised and rejected on the petitioner's direct
Third,
review via the writ of error or the writ of certiorari.
a second or subsequent habeas petition was barred if it raised a
claim that could have been raised in a previous habeas petition
filed by the same defendant." Fourth, a habeas petitioner was
barred from using habeas to attack a conviction if he was
presently also serving a concurrent sentence pursuant to another
conviction that was valid or unattacked."7
Finally, in regard to persons convicted of crime, it was a
basic principle of Georgia habeas corpus jurisprudence that the
writ could not be used as a substitute for other remedies,
including the motion for new trial, the writ of certiorari, the writ
This principle, which
of error, and the bill of exceptions."
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was closely related to the waiver of constitutional rights doctrine,
was intended to prevent convicted persons from using habeas to
bypass other, regularly established judicial procedures for the
review of convictions and sentences. This principle prevented
not only habeas review of issues which were still raisable via some
other remedy, but also of issues which once could have been
raised via the other remedy but had not been. This principle
also bolstered rules limiting postconviction habeas relief to
jurisdictional errors.
The principle that habeas was not a substitute for other
remedies was not unlimited. It did not extend to habeas claims
of lack of subject matterjurisdiction. Postconviction habeas relief
could be granted on the ground that the statute defining the
offense was unconstitutional or that the indictment failed to
allege a criminal offense, even though these claims could have
but had not been raised at trial or on direct review via a writ of
error or writ of certiorari.
I. Other Criminal Imprisonment Cases
There were numerous cases involving convicted persons who
invoked the writ of habeas corpus, not to attack the validity of
their conviction or sentence, but rather to raise a claim that some
event occurring after conviction now entitled them to habeas
relief. There were, for example, cases where habeas relief was
granted because (1) the habeas petitioner had been sentenced
to pay a fine and then was imprisoned to coerce him to pay the
fine, even though the convicting court lacked authority to coerce
payment by this method;"' (2) after being sentenced to pay a
fine or else be imprisoned, the habeas petitioner was still
imprisoned even though he had timely paid or tendered payment
of the fine;28 2 (3) after being sentenced to pay a fine or else be
imprisoned, the habeas petitioner had been released by authorities upon the promise of a third person to pay the fine and then
reimprisoned when the third party failed to pay the fine;28 (4)
after being convicted of fornication, the habeas petitioner had
married the woman with whom the offense had been committed;2 1 (5) the habeas petitioner was imprisoned under a
sentence he had fully served or that had expired; 2 1 (6) in
violation of state statutory law, the habeas petitioner was being
worked on a chain gang operated by private individuals; 26 or
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(7) in violation of the state probation statute, the habeas
petitioner's probation had been revoked without notice and a
hearing.
Habeas corpus could also be used to raise a claim
that the habeas petitioner's parole2 1 or conditional pardon2 89
had been unlawfully revoked.

J.

Other Imprisonment Cases

Miscellaneous other examples of Georgia habeas corpus
litigation included (1) cases where a U.S. Army deserter arrested
by local enforcement officials was awaiting transfer to the proper
military authorities;2 " and (2) cases where a delinquent or
wayward child, by order of a court orjudge, had been committed
to a state juvenile facility or other institution for juveniles.
Conclusion
The study of the history of the writ of habeas corpus in
Georgia between 1865 and 1965 draws our attention to interesting facts about Georgia habeas in that era.
First, as a general rule, the Georgia legislature vested the
state's habeas jurisdiction in judges, rather than in the courts
over which these judges presided. In most states, the legislature
has tended to grant habeas jurisdiction either to certain courts
themselves (rather than the individual judges of those courts) or
to both those courts and their judges. Georgia's legislature, on
the other hand, with very exceptions, refused to follow this
approach. Habeas jurisdiction was vested in superior court
judges, ordinaries, and city court judges, not superior courts,
courts of the ordinary, or city courts.
Second, in Georgia a habeas corpus petition could be filed
only at the trial court level. Neither of the state's appellate
courts (the Georgia Supreme Court and the Georgia Court of
Appeals), nor the individual appellate judges of those courts had
any original habeas corpus jurisdiction. The only way the
Georgia Supreme Court or the Georgia Court of Appeals could
hear a habeas case was on appellate review of a habeas proceeding instituted at the trial court level. In many other states, by
contrast, both the state supreme court and the individual justices
of that court had jurisdiction to entertain an original habeas
petition filed directly with the court or ajustice thereof. In those
states, the original habeas jurisdiction of the appellate court or
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of the appellate judges typically was conferred by the specific
provisions of the state constitution itself. The only habeas
provisions in Georgia's state constitutions, however, were those
dealing with suspension of the writ.
Third, in Georgia during the century covered in this Article,
there was at all times on the books a state statute that authorized
a civil action against and provided for a significant monetary
penalty to be levied on any habeas judge who in violation of his
duty refused to issue a writ of habeas corpus.2 ' There was,
however, only one reported case under the statute, and it was
unsuccessful because the statute was narrowly construed."
The memorable 1903 decision in Simmons v. GeorgiaIron &
Coal Co., " it has been said, was not only "learned and humane," but also "arguably the most important habeas decision

ever handed down by [the Georgia Supreme Court].""
Certainly at a minimum Simmons was one of the most significant
Georgia habeas decisions during the century following the Civil
War. Simmons not only lucidly analyzed the history, importance,
and function of the writ of habeas corpus, but also established
the basic procedural rules to be followed when a Georgia habeas
corpus petition is filed, while simultaneously emphasizing the
liberal, nontechnical attitude every habeas judge should display
where personal liberty is at stake.
Of perhaps greater importance was Wilcoxon v. Aldredge,"'6

in 1941, where the Georgia Supreme Court, extending its 1939
decision in Aldredge v. Williams,"' held for the first time on the
merits and after discussing the matter at length that a violation
of a fundamental federal or Georgia constitutional right was
grounds for invalidating a conviction in a habeas corpus proceeding. The court even went beyond the United States Supreme
Court by holding that not only denial of counsel, but also
ineffectiveness of counsel, could render a conviction void for lack
of jurisdiction for purposes of habeas corpus. Prior to this
holding, Georgia, like most states in the nineteenth and first half
of the twentieth centuries, restricted postconviction habeas relief
to instances of lack ofjurisdiction, and violations of fundamental
rights were not deemed to affect the jurisdiction of the convicting court. In embracing the legal fiction that a violation of the
rightuto counsel was such a fundamental error that it stripped the

convicting court of subject matter jurisdiction, the Georgia
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Supreme Court became one of the earlier state appellate courts
to emulate the United States Supreme Court by expanding the
concept of lack of jurisdiction to permit postconviction habeas
review of violations of basic rights. 2" With its decision in
Wilcoxon, the Georgia Supreme Court aligned itself with the
federal system and the numerous states which were embarked on
a path of broadening the writ of habeas corpus and thereby
commendably enlarging judicial protections of the rights of
convicted persons. Wilcoxon and its path-breaking predecessor,
Aldredge v. Williams, opened the way for the modern view that
issues involving deprivations of constitutional rights, not the
issues regarding the jurisdiction of the convicting court, are and
should be the staple of modern postconviction habeas proceedings.2 *
On the whole, the Georgia courts administered the writ of
habeas corpus in conformity with the basic principles of habeas
corpus at common law. The Georgia Supreme Court's determination that resjudicata applied to habeas corpus proceedings was
that court's boldest departure from the common law habeas
corpus.
Generally, the body of Georgia habeas jurisprudence was in
accordance with habeas jurisprudence in most other states. Like
many states, Georgia required that the habeas petitioner be
detained within the territorial jurisdiction of the court on which
the habeas judge sat; it adhered to the common law rule that
habeas relief from civil or criminal judgments was usually limited
to jurisdictional errors; it refused to allow habeas to substitute for
other remedies; it declined to allow habeas corpus to frustrate
interstate extradition of criminal suspects; and it permitted
habeas to be used to decide child custody issues. On the other
hand, Georgia differed from many states in requiring that the
return to the writ be under oath; in welcoming third-party habeas
petitions; and in forbidding, during nearly the entire century, any
suspension of habeas corpus.
What Professor Edward Jenks once called The Story of the
Habeas Corpus" is one of the finest, most enriching, and most
enduring stories in the annals of the law. The marvelous story of
the writ of habeas corpus is, after all, the story of "the most
important writ known to the constitutional law;" 30' and it is a
story that "is inextricably intertwined with the growth of funda-
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mental rights of personal liberty."so2 From this perspective, the
present Article may be regarded as a Georgia contribution to the
epic story of the inestimable writ-the writ that surely will thrive
as long as liberty lives.
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dissenting).
See, e.g., Note, Has Habeas Corpus Been Suspended in Georgia?
2.
Representing Indigent Prisoners on Georgia'sDeath Row, 17 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 605 (2000); Wm. Garth Snider, After the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death PenaltyAct of 1996-Non-CapitalHabeas CorpusRelief in Georgia,3 GA.
B.J. 20 (Oct. 1997); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., Postconviction Habeas Corpus
Relief in Geoigia:A Decade After the Habeas CorpusAct, 12 GA. L. REV. 249
(1978); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., A New Role for an Ancient Writ: Postconviction Habeas Corpus Relief in Georgia (PartII), 9 GA. L. REV. 13 (1974);
Donald E. Wilkes,Jr., A New Rolefor an Ancient Writ: PostconvictionHabeas
Corpus Relief in Georgia (PartI), 8 GA. L. REV. 313 (1974).
Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., From Oglethorpe to the Overthrow of the
3.
Confederacy: Habeas Corpus in Georgia, 1733-1865, 45 GA. L. REV. 1015
(2011).
GA. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 13; GA. CONST. of 1865 art. I, § 3.
4.
These provisions were identical to the habeas provisions of the Georgia
constitutions of 1798 and 1861. See Wilkes, A New Role for an Ancient
Wit, supra note 2, at 314 n.5. All four of these pre-1877 Georgia
habeas provisions were patterned after the habeas clause of the U.S.
Constitution.
Although the Georgia constitutions of 1865 and 1868 protected
habeas from suspension only in cases where there was no rebellion or
invasion and the public safety did not require suspension, there were
at the time broader, nonconstitutional protections against suspending
habeas. Between 1865 and 1877 provisions of Georgia statutory law
barred habeas suspension except in time of war and only as to persons
in military custody. See GA. CODE § 4009 (1873); GA. CODE § 3933
(1868); see also GA. CODE § 3909 (1863). These protective statutory
provisions which limited but nonetheless allowed suspension, were
retained in the 1882 Code, even though by then the state constitution
prohibited any habeas suspension. See GA. CODE § 4009 (1882).
GA. CONST. of 1945 art. I, § 1, para. 11; GA. CONST. of 1877 art.
5.
I, § 1, para. 11.
Suspension of this state's writ of habeas corpus is no longer
6.
constitutionally prohibited. Although Georgia's 1976 constitution
continued the ban on habeas suspension, GA. CONST. of 1976 art. I, § 1,
para. 12, the current constitution does not. Like the U.S. Constitution,
and like the Georgia constitutions of 1789, 1861, 1865, and 1868, the
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current state constitution, adopted in 1982, protects the writ but
permits its suspension if "in case of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety may require it." GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 15.
7. Some of these statutes were in fact enacted after 1933-for
example, special statutes creating city courts and conferring habeas
jurisdiction on the judge of the court. See, e.g., 1935 Ga. Laws 541
(authorizing judge of city court of Miller County to issue writs of habeas
corpus).
8.

Wilkes, From Oglethorpe to the Overthrow of the Confederacy, supra

note 3, at 1043.
9. The 1861, 1868, 1873, and 1882 Codes each had a habeas
chapter containing twenty-three sections. The habeas article of the 1895
Code had twenty-six sections, while the habeas article of the 1910 Code
had twenty-seven. The habeas title of the 1933 Code consisted of twentysix sections.
10. GA. CODE §§ 3933-3955 (1868). These provisions were located
in Chapter 1 ("Proceedings on Application for Habeas Corpus") of Title
16 ("Proceedings on Application for Habeas Corpus") of Part 3 ("The
Code of Practice") of the 1868 Code.
11. GA. CODE § 3955 (1868).
12. For discussion of this statute and its background, see Wilkes,
From Oglethorpeto the Overthrow of the Confederacy, supranote 3, at 1047-48;

see also infra note 92, and infra notes 292-93 and accompanying text.
13. Inferior courts, it should be noted, were abolished by the 1868
state constitution. GA. CONST. of 1868 art. V, § 14 ("The courts
heretofore existing in this State styled inferior courts are abolished . . . "). The 1868 constitution took effect on the same day as the
1868 Code. See infra note 22.
14. GA. CODE § 3911 (1861). Both superior court judges and
justices of inferior courts had been statutorily authorized to grant
habeas writs since the 1790s. See Wilkes, From Oglethorpe to the Overthrow
of the Confederay, supra note 3, at 1037-38.

15. GA. CODE § 3935 (1868). See also GA. CODE § 311(1) (county
judge shall have authority to issue habeas writs), and § 276 (county
court at quarter sessions has jurisdiction in habeas cases).
16. GA. CODE § 3930 (1861).
17. GA. CODE § 3953 (1868).
18. GA. CODE § 3924(2) (1861).
19. GA. CODE § 3947(2) (1868).
20. GA. CODE § 3921 (1861).
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21. GA. CONST. of 1868 art. V, § 16 "([Tihe county courts now
existing in Georgia are hereby abolished.").
22. The 1868 Georgia Code was put into effect by the 1868 state
constitution, GA. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 3. Both the 1868 Code and
the 1868 constitution became effective on July 21, 1868. This does not
mean that county courts never had habeas jurisdiction. County courts
and the offices of county judges had been created by 1865-66 Ga. Laws
64, enacted on March 17, 1866, which included a provision giving
county courts jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases. Although county
courts never had an opportunity to exercise the habeas jurisdiction
given them by the 1868 Code, they did possess-and presumably did
exercise-a statutory habeas jurisdiction during the two years before the
1868 Code came into operation. The 1866 statute vested habeas
jurisdiction in the county court, not the county courtjudge. This was
one of the few occasions when the Georgia legislature conferred habeas
power on a court rather than a judge of the court.
23. GA. CODE §§ 4009-4031 (1873). These provisions were located
in Chapter 1 ("Proceedings on Application for Habeas Corpus") of Title
16 ("Proceedings on Application for Habeas Corpus") of Part 3 ("The
Code of Practice") of the 1873 Code.
24. GA. CODE § 4011 (1873). Courts of the ordinary (which are
now known as probate courts) were first constitutionally authorized by
GA. CONST. of 1861 art. IV, § 1, cl. 1; art. IV, § 3, cl. 5. Ordinaries
(currently known as probate judges) had first been vested with power
to issue writs of habeas corpus five years earlier, in 1868, pursuant to
1868 Ga. Laws 128.
25. GA. CODE § 4011 (1873). Ordinaries had first been prohibited
from issuing the writ in capital cases one year earlier, in 1872, pursuant
to 1872 Ga. Laws 44.
26. GA. CODE § 4029 (1873).
27. GA.CODE § 3947(2) (1868).
28. Id. § 3947(3). Presumably, this was repealed because imprisonment for debt had been abolished by the 1868 constitution. See GA.
CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 18 ("There shall be no imprisonment for
debt.").
29. GA. CODE §§ 4009-4031 (1882). These provisions were located
in Chapter 1 ("Proceedings on Application for Habeas Corpus") of Title
16 ("Proceedings on Application for Habeas Corpus") of Part 3 ("The
Code of Practice") of the 1882 Code.
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30. GA. PENAL CODE §§ 1209-1234 (1895). These provisions of the
Penal Code were located in Article 1 ("Proceedings on Habeas
Corpus"), which itself was located within two unnumbered subdivisions,
"Special Quasi Criminal Proceedings" and "Habeas Corpus."
31. GA. PENAL CODE § 1212 (1895); see also GA. CODE § 4286
(1895) (judges of city courts established on recommendation of a grand
jury shall have same power to issue writs of habeas corpus as ajudge of
superior court). GA. CODE § 4286 (1895) was not reenacted in the
1910 and 1933 Codes. Not to be confused with municipal courts, city
courts were state trial courts, often of county-wide jurisdiction, and
typically could try both misdemeanors and minor civil actions. ALBERT
BERRY SAYE, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF GEORGIA, 1732-1945, at 40809 (1948); see also Edward C. Brewer, III, The City Court ofAtlanta and the
1983 Georgia Constitution:Is theJudicialEngine Souped Up or Blown Up?, 15
GA. ST. U. L. REv. 941, 946-58 (1999) (surveying history of city courts).
Trials in city courts were by jury, unless waived. In the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries there were two types of city courts in
Georgia: (1) city courts established on recommendation of the local
grand jury, and (2) city courts established by special statute. Brewer,
supra, at 946-47.
City courts established on recommendation on a grand jury dated
back to 1891, when 1890-91 Ga. Laws 96, as amended by 1892 Ga. Laws
107, provided for the automatic establishment of city courts, on
recommendation of the local grand jury, in counties with a population
of 10,000 or more. These two statutes provided that the city courts
established under the two Acts would have the same powers and
jurisdiction as the city court of Macon previously established by an 1885
special statute, 1884-85 Ga. Laws 470. Because the 1885 statute gave the
judge of the city court of Macon authority to issue writs of habeas
corpus with the same power of the judge of the superior court, the
judges of all city courts established on recommendation of the grand
jury had the same authority as superior court judges to issue writs of
habeas corpus.
Thus, the habeas corpus jurisdiction of judges of city courts
established on recommendation of the grand jury antedated the 1895
Code by several years. The habeas jurisdiction of city court judges
created by special statute is examined infra at note 50. Numerous city
courts still existed as late as 1965. Volume 110 of the Georgia Appeals
Reports lists fifty-five city courts for that year. City court judges
continued to hear habeas cases until the mid-1960s. See, e.g., Dutton v.
Mims, 223 Ga. 423, 156 S.E.2d 93 (1967). In 1970, the remaining city
courts were renamed state courts. See 1970 Ga. Laws 679.
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32. GA. PENAL CODE § 1212 (1895). Ordinaries had first been
prohibited from hearing habeas petitions in extradition cases a decade
earlier, in 1885, pursuant to 1884-85 Ga. Laws 50.

33. This was the second sentence of GA. CODE § 4009 (1882),
which provided: "And this right shall be suspended or denied only in
times of existing war, and then only as to such persons as shall be in
military confinement." Id.
34. GA. PENAL CODE § 1209 (1895).
35.
CODE

Id. § 1225. This provision was not new. It originated in GA.
§ 3769 (1861). It had not, however, previously been included in

the habeas chapters of the previous Georgia Codes.
The writ of habeas corpus testificandum is a different type of writ
of habeas corpus. It is not the Great Writ. It is not used in behalf of
imprisoned persons to challenge the legality of the imprisonment.
Instead, it is "used to bring up a prisoner detained in ajail or prison to
give evidence before the court [that issued the writ]." BLACK'S LAw
DICIONARY 639 (5th ed. 1979). While the prisoner is being conveyed

to or appears in court, he remains in custody, and after testifying he is
returned in custody to his previous imprisonment.
36. The portion of GA. CODE § 4025 (1882) up to the semicolon
was reenacted as GA. PENAL CODE § 1227 (1895), and the remainder
was reenacted as GA. PENAL CODE § 1228 (1895). The portion that was
reenacted as § 1227 prohibited a habeas petitioner from being
discharged from custody on criminal charges by reason of any defect in
the affidavit, warrant, or commitment if there was probable cause for
his detention. The portion that was reenacted as § 1228 provided that
if the petitioner had been arrested on reasonable suspicion of committing a crime in another state, he could not be discharged until there
had been sufficient time for the other state to demand his extradition.

37. GA. PENAL CODE §§ 1290-1316 (1910). These provisions of the
1910 Penal Code were located in Article 1 ("Proceedings on Habeas
Corpus"), which itself was located within two unnumbered subdivisions,
"Habeas Corpus" and "Special Quasi Criminal Proceedings."
This provision, which
38.
GA. PENAL CODE § 1316 (1910).
authorized what was known as a "fast writ of error," codified a statute
enacted over a decade earlier. See 1897 Ga. Laws 53. For case law on
this Code section, which was reenacted by GA. CODE § 50-126 (1933),
see Richards v. McHan, 139 Ga. 37, 76 S.E. 382 (1912); Barranger v.
Baum, 103 Ga. 465, 30 S.E. 524 (1898); Weaver v. Thompson, 11 Ga.

App. 132, 74 S.E. 901 (1912).
39.

Benton v. State, 176 Ga. 148, 153, 199 S.E. 749, 751 (1938).
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GA. PENAL CODE

§ 1293 (1910).

41. Id. § 1290.
42. GA. CODE §§ 50-101 to -126 (1933).
43. See GA. CODE § 4750 (1868) (prisoners not to be discharged on
habeas because of informality in the commitment); id § 3647 (fees of
jailors for discharging prisoners in habeas cases); id. § 3646(2) (fees of
sheriffs in habeas cases); id. § 1785 (use of habeas to determine
possession of child in cases of separation or remarriage of the parents);
id. § 311(1) (county judges may grant habeas writs); id. § 276 (county
court at quarter sessions has jurisdiction in habeas cases); id. § 237(1)
(superior courtjudges may grant habeas writs); see also GA. CODE app'x
4811 (1868) (judge of city court of Savannah may issue habeas writs).
44. See GA. CODE § 81-102 (1933) (nothing in Uniform Procedure
Act shall repeal or affect the mode of habeas corpus proceedings); id.
§ 74-106 (use of habeas to determine possession of child in case of
either separation of the parents or the death of one parent and the
remarriage of the survivor); id. § 38-1505 (superior court may issue writ
of habeas corpus ad testificandum to produce in court a witness under
legal imprisonment); id. § 27-2521 (convict sentenced to death but not
yet executed may be brought before superior court of conviction on a
writ of habeas corpus to inquire into facts and circumstances of the
case); id. § 27-422 (prisoners not to be discharged on habeas because
of informality in the commitment); id. § 24-2823 (fees of sheriffs in
habeas cases); id. § 24-2616(1), (4) (superior court judges may grant
writs of habeas corpus and may hear and determine questions arising
upon writs of habeas corpus).
45. County courts did have habeasjurisdiction under an uncodified
statute from 1866 to 1868. See supra note 23. These county courts,
created in 1866 and then abolished in 1868, must be distinguished
from the county courts created in 1872. See infra note 49.
46. Ordinaries first acquired habeas jurisdiction under a thenuncodified statute in 1868. See supra note 24.
47. The 1895 and 1910 Codes were the only Georgia Codes to
grant habeas jurisdiction to city court judges established on the
recommendation of a grand jury. City court judges established on
grand jury recommendation were first given habeas jurisdiction under
the authority of an uncodified statute passed in 1891.
48. In 1870, the Georgia legislature created district courts presided
over by districtjudges vested with power to issue writs of habeas corpus
within their respective districts. 1870 Ga. Laws 33, 35. This habeas
jurisdiction existed only briefly, because the statute creating the court
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and its judges was repealed less than a year after taking effect. See 1871
Ga. Laws 68.
49. Although the state's original county courts had been abolished
by the 1868 state constitution, the Georgia legislature created a new set
of county courts in 1872 in most but not all of the state's counties.
1871 Ga. Laws 288. The following year the judges of these courts were
vested with the same power to grant habeas writs that ordinaries
possessed. 1873 Ga. Laws 36. As the nineteenth century progressed,
county courts were gradually replaced by city courts. ERWIN C.
SURRENCY, THE CREATION OF A JUDICIAL SYSTEM: THE HISTORY OF
GEORGIA COURTS, 1733 TO PRESENT 108 (2001).
50. Quite apart from the city courts created on grand jury
recommendation, a city court could also come into existence by virtue
of a special statute creating it. See Stewart v. State, 98 Ga. 202, 204, 25
S.E. 424, 425 (1896) (distinguishing city courts owing their existence to
special acts of the legislature and city courts created pursuant to grand
jury recommendation); Welborne v. State, 114 Ga. 793, 808-09, 40 S.E.
857, 864 (1902) (noting that between 1877 and 1901 Georgia legislature
created more than forty city courts by special enactment).
Judges of city courts established by special statute, who were never
granted habeas jurisdiction under any Georgia Code, first were granted
habeasjurisdiction by an uncodified statute in 1871, when the city court
of Atlanta, the first city court created after 1865, was established. There
were two varieties of city courts created by special statute: (1) constitutional city courts, and (2) statutory city courts. See Barnes v. State, 211
Ga. 469, 469, 86 S.E.2d 298, 299 (1955) (distinguishing constitutional
city courts from statutory city courts); Johnston v. Dollar, 89 Ga. App.
876, 880, 81 S.E.2d 502, 505 (1954) (noting that decisions of constitutional city courts may be directly reviewed by Georgia Supreme Court
or Georgia Court of Appeals on writ of error; decisions of statutory city
courts may not).
Although none of the Georgia Codes conferred habeas jurisdiction
on the judges of city courts created by special statute, these judges
nonetheless would have habeas jurisdiction under two circumstances.
First, the statute creating the particular city court might, as was often
the case, explicitly confer habeas power on the judge of the court. See,
e.g., Sumner v. Sumner, 117 Ga. 229, 229, 43 S.E. 485, 485 (1903)
(judge of the city court of Wrightsville had power to issue writs of
habeas corpus because 1899 statute creating the that city court expressly
granted that power to the judge).
Dozens of pre-1933 special statutes, each creating a particular city
court, contained a section or provision authorizing the judge of that city
court to issue writs of habeas corpus, often with the same power as a
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superior court judge. See, e.g., 1931 Ga. Laws 344 (Lyons); 1929 Ga.
Laws 425 (Fairburn); 1927 Ga. Laws 407 (Jonesboro); 1925 Ga. Laws
442 (Lakeland); 1921 Ga. Laws 307 (Crawfordville); 1919 Ga. Laws 415
(Alma); 1916 Ga. Laws 300 (Swainsboro); 1916 Ga. Laws 275 (Morgan);
1915 Ga. Laws 83 (Darien); 1912 Ga. Laws 324 (Wrightsville); 1912 Ga.
Laws 293 (Quitman); 1907 Ga. Laws 220 (Oglethorpe); 1907 Ga. Laws
198 (Millen); 1907 Ga. Laws 186 (Fort Gaines); 1907 Ga. Laws 177
(Flovilla); 1907 Ga. Laws 161 (Fitzgerald); 1907 Ga. Laws 148 (Covington); 1906 Ga. Laws 306 (Newton); 1906 Ga. Laws 194 (Cairo); 1906
Ga. Laws 152 (Ashburn); 1905 Ga. Laws 401 (Washington); 1905 Ga.
Laws 388 (Thomasville); 1905 Ga. Laws 373 (Sylvester); 1905 Ga. Laws
338 (Reidsville); 1905 Ga. Laws 327 (Pelham); 1905 Ga. Laws 296
(Miller County); 1905 Ga. Laws 282 (McRae); 1905 Ga. Laws 266
(Leesburg); 1905 Ga. Laws 213 (Eastman); 1905 Ga. Laws 186 (Camilla); 1903 Ga. Laws 141 (Jefferson); 1902 Ga. Laws 175 (Tifton); 1902
Ga. Laws 166 (Sylvania); 1901 Ga. Laws 104 (Buford); 1901 Ga. Laws
203 (Waynesboro); 1901 Ga. Laws 192 (Vienna); 1901 Ga. Laws 180
(Valdosta); 1901 Ga. Laws 167 (Sandersville); 1901 Ga. Laws 158 (Polk
County); 1901 Ga. Laws 149 (Mount Vernon); 1901 Ga. Laws 139
(Moultrie); 1901 Ga. Laws 133 (Moultrie); 1901 Ga. Laws 115 (Carnesville); 1900 Ga. Laws 119 ( Dublin); 1900 Ga. Laws 108 (Bainbridge);
1900 Ga. Laws 96 (Americus); 1899 Ga. Laws 432 (Wrightsville); 1899
Ga. Laws 415 (Washington); 1899 Ga. Laws 399 (Lexington); 1899 Ga.
Laws 389 (LaGrange); 1899 Ga. Laws 340 (Barnesville); 1899 Ga. Laws
399 (Lexington); 1899 Ga. Laws 372 (Greenville); 1899 Ga. Laws 359;
1898 Ga. Laws 328 (Swainsboro); 1898 Ga. Laws 313 (Dawson); 1897
Ga. Laws 513 (Waycross); 1897 Ga. Laws 501 (Valdosta); 1897 Ga. Laws
488 (Jefferson); 1897 Ga. Laws 474 (Forsyth); 1897 Ga. Laws 465
(Griffin); 1897 Ga. Laws 450 (Douglas); 1897 Ga. Laws 432 (Camilla);
1897 Ga. Laws 423 (Baxley); 1897 Ga. Laws 411 (Albany); 1896 Ga.
Laws 290 (Elberton); 1895 Ga. Laws 387 (Gwinnett County); 1895 Ga.
Laws 377 (Brunswick); 1895 Ga. Laws 361 (Coffee County); 1893 Ga.
Laws 375 (DeKalb County); 1886-87 Ga. Laws 693 (Newnan); 1884-85
Ga. Laws 487 (Bartow County); 1884-85 Ga. Laws 472 (Macon); 1884-85
Ga. Laws 460 (Columbus); 1882-83 Ga. Laws 541 (Floyd County); 1871
Ga. Laws 58 (Atlanta).
Second, even though there was no mention of the writ of habeas
corpus in the special act creating the city court, the statute might
contain a section which, when properly construed, gave the judge of the
court habeas jurisdiction. In Barrangerv. Baum, for example, the judge
of the city court of Richmond County was held to possess habeas
jurisdiction because the statute creating the court conferred on the
judge the same powers and authority of judges of the superior court.
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103 Ga. 465, 467, 30 S.E. 524, 526.
51. See, e.g., 1890-91 Ga. Laws 936 (judge of criminal court of
Atlanta shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus); 1877 Ga. Laws
81-82 (judge of criminal court of Washington County shall have power
to issue writs of habeas corpus); 1874 Ga. Laws 336 (commissioners of
Chatham County, acting as ex officio judges, may issue writs of habeas
corpus in absence or incapacity ofjudge of superior court,judge of city
court of Savannah, and ordinary).
52. A sixth statute, 1946 Ga. Laws 726, 747-48, made technical
amendments, not warranting discussion here, to GA. CODE § 50-126
(1933), which governed habeas appeals to the Georgia Supreme Court.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

1951 Ga. Laws 291.
Id. at 298-99.
See infra notes 174-95 and accompanying text.
1951 Ga. Laws 726, 729.
1951 Ga. Laws 735.
1956 Ga. Laws 374.
GA. CODE § 50-107 (1933) (as amended 1956).
1958 Ga. Laws 697.
Id. at 709.

1964 Ga. Laws 499.
GA. CODE § 88-406 (1933) (as enacted 1964).
64. "If a writ of habeas corpus be obtained in behalf of a person
ordered hospitalized and confined by the Department of Health, and
it appears at the hearing on the return of such writ that such person
may properly be discharged, or if the person's condition is such that it
will be in the best interest for him and for others for him to be discharged, the judge or justice before the hearing is held shall so
direct .... " GA. CODE § 88-406 (1933) (as enacted 1964).
62.
63.

65.
66.

117 Ga. 305, 43 S.E. 780 (1903).
Id. at 309, 43 S.E.2d at 781.
Id. "The proceeding is sometimes characterized as a 'cause' or

67.
'action,' but erroneously so . . . [I] t can never be accurately characterized as a technical suit or action." Id. (emphasis omitted); see also
Robertson v. Heath, 132 Ga. 310, 313, 64 S.E. 73, 74 (1909) (noting
that a habeas proceeding "is not exactly a lawsuit in the ordinary sense
of the term"), overruled by Camp v. Camp, 213 Ga. 65, 97 S.E.2d 125
(1957). Today, however, a Georgia habeas proceeding is Acivil action,
subject to civil procedure rules.
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68. GA. CODE § 50-101 (1933).
69. In child custody habeas litigation, where the issue was not
personal liberty but who was entitled to the custody of a minor, the
habeas petition usually was filed by the attorney representing the
person, typically a parent or relative, seeking custody of the child.
70. GA. CODE § 50-101.
71. Broomhead v. Chisolm, 47 Ga. 390, 393-94 (1872). In this case,
which was instituted by a third-party in behalf of a prisoner on a chain
gang, the respondent, in answering the habeas writ, had moved to
dismiss the writ, complaining to the judge that the third-party "ha[d]
no interest in the person of [the prisoner], and does not show, by his
petition, any legal authority for suing out said writ." Id. at 391.
72. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163 (1990). In federal
habeas practice, third-party habeas corpus petitions were frowned upon
and allowed only if (1) the third-party provided an adequate explanation why the prisoner could not appear on his own behalf, and (2) the
third-party was truly dedicated to the interests of the prisoner.
Furthermore, the third-party probably had to have some significant
relationship with the prisoner, and was required to prove that he was
a person entitled to file the habeas petition in behalf of the prisoner.
Id. at 163-64. In the federal system, third-party habeas petitions are
commonly referred to as next-friend petitions. See id.
73. See, e.g., Reid v. Perkerson, 207 Ga. 27, 60 S.E.2d 151 (1950)
(husband); Wells v. Pridgeon, 154 Ga. 397, 114 S.E. 355 (1922) (wife).
74. See, e.g., Daniels v. Towers, 89 Ga. 785, 786, 7 S.E. 120, 121
(1887) (mother); Howard v. Tucker, 12 Ga. App. 353, 353-54, 77 S.E.
191, 192 (1913) (brother); Wright v. Sheppard, 5 Ga. App. 298, 298, 63
S.E. 48, 48 (1908) (father).
75. See, e.g., Stover v. State, 220 Ga. 17, 136 S.E.2d 743, 744 (1964);
Jeffers v. State, 217 Ga. 740, 124 S.E.2d 753, 753 (1962); Marshall v. City
of Griffin, 173 Ga. 782, 782, 161 S.E. 622, 622 (1931); Fortson v. Elbert
County, 117 Ga. 149, 149, 43 S.E. 492, 492 (1903); Lark v. State, 55 Ga.
435, 436 (1875); Brieswick v. City of Brunswick, 51 Ga. 639, 640 (1874);
see also Soviero v. State, 220 Ga. 119, 119-20, 137 S.E.2d 471, 471 (1964).
76. See, eg., McCain v. Smith, 221 Ga. 353, 353, 144 S.E.2d 522, 523
(1965); Crane v. Thompson, 218 Ga. 47, 47, 126 S.E.2d 204 (1962);
Smith v. Balkcom, 205 Ga. 408, 408, 54 S.E.2d 272, 272 (1949).
77. See, e.g., Etheridge v. Poston, 176 Ga. 388, 389, 168 S.E. 25, 26
(1933); Carr v. Cook, 165 Ga. 472, 472, 141 S.E. 202, 203 (1928);
Pearson v. -Wimbish, 124 Ga. 701, 706, 52 S.E. 751, 754 (1906);
McFarland v. Donaldson, 115 Ga. 567, 567, 41 S.E. 1000, 1001 (1902);
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McBride v. Graeber, 16 Ga. App. 240, 240, 85 S.E. 86, 87 (1915).
78. See, e.g., House v. Grimes, 214 Ga. 572, 572, 105 S.E.2d 745, 746
(1958); Murphy v. Lowry, 178 Ga. 138, 138, 172 S.E. 457, 457 (1933);
Peebles v. Mangum, 142 Ga. 699, 700, 83 S.E. 522, 522 (1914).
79. See, e.g., Reid, 207 Ga. at 28, 60 S.E.2d at 153; Griffin v. Smith,
184 Ga. 871, 871, 193 S.E. 777, 777 (1937); Cason v. McLeod, 168 Ga.
702, 703, 148 S.E. 584, 584 (1929); Hicks v. Hamrick, 144 Ga. 403, 403,
87 S.E. 415, 415 (1915); Holders v. Beavers, 141 Ga. 217, 217, 80 S.E.
715, 715 (1914); see also Gibson v. Gober, 204 Ga. 714, 714, 51 S.E.2d
664, 664 (1949) (superintendent of city prisons); Stephens v. Henderson, 120 Ga. 218, 47 S.E. 498 (1904) (city marshal).
80. See Simmons, 117 Ga. at 316, 43 S.E. at 784 ("We are satisfied
that when a statute creates a court with jurisdiction over a given
territory, and confers upon the judge of that court power to grant the
writ of habeas corpus, the right to issue the writ is coextensive with the
territorial jurisdiction of the court in other matters."). In child custody
cases, where there was no prisoner, the habeas petition had to be
submitted to a habeas judge with territorial jurisdiction over the county
of residence of the person in possession of the child. See infra note 141
and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 50-103.
82. See Day v. Smith, 172 Ga. 467, 470-71, 157 S.E. 639, 641 (1931)
("The petition for this writ may be presented to the .
the county where such illegal detention exists .. . ).

83.
CODE

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

..

ordinary of

See Simmons, 117 Ga. at 316, 43 S.E. at 784; see also GA. PENAL
§ 1293 (1910); GA. PENAL CODE § 1212 (1895).
See Simmons, 117 Ga. at 315, 43 S.E. at 784.
See, e.g., GA. CODE § 50-102.
See, e.g., id. § 50-103.
See, e.g., id. § 50-102.
Id.

89. Simmons, 117 Ga. at 308, 43 S.E. at 781.
90. Id. at 312, 43 S.E. at 783.
91. "It is therefore the duty of the court in every case, before
issuing the writ, to inspect the application to see if it contains sufficient
averments and is properly verified. If it lacks these essential requisites,
he should decline to issue the writ." Id. See also Jones v. Hill, 17 Ga.
App. 151, 155, 87 S.E. 755, 757 (1915) ("[I]t is clear that the legislature
had in mind instances in which applications would be made for the writ
when it would not be the duty of the judge to grant it, but on the
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contrary it would be his duty to refuse it ....
[T]he Legislature had
in view cases where there would be a refusal because it would not be
the duty of the judge in that particular instance to issue the writ.").
92. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 50-104 (1933) ("If upon examination of
the petition it shall appear to the judge that the restraint of liberty is
illegal, he shall grant the writ of habeas corpus ..... "). Id. (emphasis
added); see also Simmons, 117 Ga. at 311, 43 S.E. at 782 (if judge
determines that the habeas petition contains sufficient averments and
is properly verified, "it is 'his duty to grant it . . . "'); Perry v. Mclen-

don, 62 Ga. 598, 604 (1879) ("Doubtless there is an obligation to issue
the writ of habeas corpus whenever, and as often as, it may be applied
for, provided the petition contains the requisite matter, is in due form,
duly authenticated, duly presented, and does not show on its face that
the imprisonment, though complained of as illegal, is in fact legal.").
Each of the Georgia Codes from 1868 to 1933, it will be remembered, included a section providing that if any person applied for a writ
of habeas corpus to a Georgiajudge whose duty it was to grant the writ,
and the judge refused to grant the writ, the judge would forfeit to the
person aggrieved the sum of $2500, to be recovered in any Georgia
court having jurisdiction. GA. CODE § 3955 (1868); GA. CODE § 4031
(1873); GA. CODE § 4031 (1882); GA. PENAL CODE § 1234 (1895); GA.
PENAL CODE § 1315 (1910); GA. CODE § 50-105 (1933).
By requiring that the writ actually be issued whenever the habeas
petition was facially sufficient, Georgia declined to adopt the approach
which the federal courts began using in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, see Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941), under
which a court, instead of issuing a habeas writ in response to a facially
sufficient habeas petition, issued instead a show cause order, which did
not require production of the prisoner and did not mandate the filing
of an actual return. Id. at 284-85.
93. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 50-106 (1933).
94. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 50-108 (1933).
95. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 50-115 (1933).
96. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 50-107 (1933). Under a 1956 statute, the
return time in cases of criminal imprisonment was shortened to eight
days. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. However, under
Wright v. Davis, 120 Ga. 670, 48 S.E. 170 (1904), the return could be
amended at any time before the final disposition of the case. Id. at 671,
48 S.E. at 171.
97. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 50-111 (1933). The Georgia requirement
that the return be under oath is unusual. At common law, it was not
required that the return be under oath; nor has this been required in
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federal habeas proceedings; nor, it appears, is this commonly required
in the habeas statutes of the other states.
98. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 50-114 (1933).
99. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 50-120 (1933). However, under Pridgem v.
James, 168 Ga. 770, 149 S.E. 48 (1929), this notice requirement was held
not to be jurisdictional; and if the warden (the immediate custodian)
was properly served, and there was no objection by the solicitor general
until after a final judgment in favor of the habeas petitioner, the
requirement was deemed waived. Id. at 770, 149 S.E. at 48, 49.
100. See, e.g., Kinman v. Clark, 185 Ga. 328, 330, 195 S.E. 166, 168
(1938); Coleman v. Grimes, 154 Ga. 852, 853, 115 S.E. 641, 641 (1923);
Smith v. Milton, 149 Ga. 28, 29-30, 98 S.E. 607, 608 (1919).
101. See, e.g., GA. CODE
102. See, e.g., GA. CODE
103. See, e.g., GA. CODE

§ 50-116 (1933).
§ 50-117 (1933).
§ 50-118 (1933).

104. GA. CODE § 50-119 (1933).
105. See, e.g., Dixon v. Beaty, 188 Ga. 689, 690, 4 S.E.2d 633, 634-35
(1939).
106. See, e.g., Jones v. Grimes, 219 Ga. 585, 587, 134 S.E.2d 790, 792
(1964).
107. See, e.g., Thompson v. Aldredge, 187 Ga. 467, 200 S.E. 799
(1939).
108. Day, 172 Ga. at 474, 157 S.E. at 643.
109. Id. at 475, 157 S.E. at 643.
110. See, e.g., Wilcoxon v. Aldredge, 192 Ga. 634, 639, 15 S.E.2d 873,
877 (1941).
111. See, e.g., Goble v. Reese, 214 Ga. 697, 700, 107 S.E.2d 175, 17778 (1959).
112. See Perry, 62 Ga. at 603 ("IJ]udgments on habeas corpus are, in
this state, subject to review-by writ of error, if rendered by the judge
of the superior court .....

).

113. See, e.g., Green v. Loggins, 216 Ga. 169, 171-72, 115 S.E.2d 350,
353 (1960); Delinski v. Dunn, 206 Ga. 825, 59 S.E.2d 248 (1950); Day,
172 Ga. App. at 470-71, 157 S.E. at 641.
114. See, e.g., Russell v. Tatum, 104 Ga. 332, 332, 30 S.E. 812, 813
(1898); Badkins v. Robinson, 53 Ga. 613, 615 (1875).
115. See, e.g., Cone v. American Surety Co., 154 Ga. 841, 115 S.E. 481
(1923); Ash v. People's Bank of Oliver, 149 Ga. 713, 101 S.E. 912
(1920); Welborne; 114 Ga. 793, 40 S.E. 857; Wells v. Newton, 101 Ga.
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141, 28 S.E. 640 (1897); Western & A. R. Co. v. Voils, 98 Ga. 446, 26
S.E. 483 (1896); Stewart, 98 Ga. 202, 25 S.E. 424; Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Jackson, 98 Ga. 207, 25 S.E. 264 (1896).
116. See, e.g., Crosson v. Sumner, 125 Ga. 291, 293, 54 S.E. 181, 182
(1906); Monford v. State, 114 Ga. 528, 529, 40 S.E. 798, 799 (1902);
Welborne, 114 Ga. at 806, 40 S.E. at 863; Wells, 101 Ga. at 143-44, 28 S.E.
at 641; Stewart, 98 Ga. at 203-04, 25 S.E. at 424-25; Jackson,98 Ga. at 20910, 25 S.E. at 264.
No reported cases can be cited where a habeas proceeding was
instituted before ajudge of a city court established on recommendation
of a grand jury, thatjudge's decision was taken to the superior court on
a writ of certiorari, and the decision of the superior court was then
reviewed by the Georgia Supreme Court on a writ of error. The
reporters do not prove sufficient information to permit us to determine whether, when the Georgia Supreme Court on a writ of error reviewed a habeas decision of a superior court, the habeas proceeding
had originated in a city court established on recommendation of a
grand jury.
117. Galloway v. Mitchell County Elec. Membership Corp., 190 Ga.
428, 434, 9 S.E.2d 903, 907 (1940). For Georgia Supreme Court
decisions defining the sometimes complicated term "constitutional city
court," see Cone,154 Ga. at 845, 115 S.E. 481; Ash, 144 Ga. at 716, 101
S.E. at 913; Welhorne, 114 Ga. at 809, 40 S.E. at 864; Stewart, 98 Ga. at
203-04, 25 S.E. at 424-25. Under these decisions, a city court established on recommendation of a grandjury could not be a constitutional
city court.
118. See Cone, 154 Ga. at 848, 115 S.E. at 483; Welborne, 114 Ga. at
806, 40 S.E. at 863; Heard v. State, 113 Ga. 444, 447, 39 S.E. 118, 119
(1901); Ivey v. State, 112 Ga. 175, 178, 37 S.E. 398, 399 (1900); Cooper
v. State, 103 Ga. 405, 406, 30 S.E. 249, 249 (1898); Voils, 98 Ga. at 451,
26 S.E. at 483.
For examples of Georgia Supreme Court decisions reviewing on a
writ of error a habeas decision of a judge of a constitutional city court,
see Balkcom v. Gardner, 220 Ga. 352, 139 S.E.2d 129 (1964); Fair v.
Balkcom, 216 Ga. 721, 119 S.E.2d 691 (1961); Kirkland v. Canty, 122
Ga. 261, 50 S.E. 90 (1905); Morton v. Nelms, 118 Ga. 786, 45 S.E. 616
(1903); Simmons, 117 Ga. 305, 43 S.E. 780 (1903); Sumner, 117 Ga. 229,
43 S.E. 485; Barranger,103 Ga. 465, 30 S.E. 524.
Between 1907 and 1916 the Georgia Court of Appeals, created by
a 1906 state constitutional amendment, 1906 Ga. Laws 24, also exercised
appellate review of habeas decisions of judges of constitutional city
courts. During this first decade of its existence, the Georgia Court of
Appeals decided twenty-seven reported habeas appeals, twenty-four of
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which reviewed habeas decisions of constitutional city court judges.
The other three appeals reviewed habeas decisions of superior court
judges.
Here, in chronological order, are those twenty-seven decisions, the
only habeas corpus appeals in the Georgia Court of Appeals in its entire
history: (1) Walker v. Jones, 1 Ga. App. 70, 57 S.E. 903 (1907) (child
custody); (2) Fincher v. Collum, 2 Ga. App. 740, 59 S.E. 22 (1907)
(postconviction); (3) Yeates v. Roberson, 4 Ga. App. 573, 62 S.E. 104
(1908) (postconviction); (4) Callaway v. Mims, 5 Ga. App. 9, 62 S.E. 654
(1908) (postconviction); (5) Wright, 5 Ga. App. 298, 63 S.E. 48 (road
court conviction); (6) Jordan v. Smith, 5 Ga. App. 559, 63 S.E. 595
(1909) (child custody); (7) Davis v. Smith, 7 Ga. App. 192, 66 S.E. 401
(1909) (road court conviction); (8) Loeb v. Jennings, 7 Ga. App. 524,
67 S.E. 536 (1910) (postconviction); (9) Crosby v. Potts, 8 Ga. App. 463,
69 S.E. 582 (1910) (material witness jailed to secure his appearance at
trial); (10) Evans v. Lane, 8 Ga. App. 826,70 S.E. 603 (1911) (child
custody); (11) Manning v. Crawford, 8 Ga. App. 826, 70 S.E. 959 (1911)
(child custody); (12) Crapps v. Smith, 9 Ga. App. 400, 71 S.E. 501
(1911) (child custody); (13) Abram v. Maples, 10 Ga. App. 137, 72 S.E.
932 (1911) (convict has a right, within a reasonable time, to pay
monetary part of his sentence; relief granted); (14) Crowder v. Maples,
10 Ga. App. 142, 72 S.E. 934 (1911) (same); (15) Daniel v. Persons, 10
Ga. App. 830, 74 S.E. 573 (1912) (there is no law in this state which
confers upon ajudge any power or authority to suspend the execution
of a sentence imposed in a criminal case; here, portion of convict's
sentence to service on chain gang that suspended sentence during good
behavior was of no force); Daniel v. Persons, 137 Ga. 826, 828, 74 S.E.
260, 260-61 (1912). Here, provision in sentence of convict to service in
chain gang, suspending sentence during good behavior was of no force;
(16) Weaver, 11 Ga. App. 132, 74 S.E. 901 (1912) (child custody); (17)
Crawford v. Manning, 12 Ga. App. 54, 76 S.E. 771 (1912) (child
custody); (18) Lewis v. Harris, 12 Ga. App. 305, 77 S.E. 108 (1913)
(postconviction); (19) Howard, 12 Ga. App. at 354, 77 S.E. at 192
(deputy sheriffs discharge of convicted person by accepting another's
promise to pay fine precludes rearrest of the convicted person for
nonpayment of fine; relief granted); (20) Norman v. Rehberg, 12 Ga.
App. 698, 700, 78 S.E. 256, 257 (1913) (under rulings of this state's
highest court, it was wholly beyond the power of the court that imposed
the sentence to propose any condition compliance with which would
have the effect of altering or voiding a sentence which the court had
authority to impose; where, on conviction of larceny, accused was
sentenced to a fine and to be confined at hard labor in the chain gang,
a suspension of the sentence as to the imprisonment during good
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behavior was void); (21) Johnson v. Harris, 13 Ga. App. 618, 618, 79
S.E. 588, 588 (1913) (the questions involved on appeal in a habeas
corpus proceeding, being moot questions after expiration of the time
for which the petitioner was sentenced to serve in the city chain gang,
will not be considered); (22) Mathews v. Swatts, 16 Ga. App. 208, 84
S.E. 980 (1915) (ajudge has no authority to amend his judgment in a
criminal case after the term of court at which it was passed has expired,
and, when amended at that term, the amendment must be before the
execution of the sentence has begun); (23) McBride, 16 Ga. App. 240,
85 S.E. 86 (1915) (indictment did not charge a crime; postconviction
relief granted); (24) Walden v. Morris, 16 Ga. App. 408, 85 S.E. 452
(1915) (habeas claim regarding whether convicted person paid fine);
(25) Turner v. Hill, 17 Ga. 257, 86 S.E. 460 (1915) (civil process
imprisonment); (26) Cross v. Foote, 17 Ga. App. 802, 88 S.E. 594
(1916) (postconviction); (27) Ellis v. Golden, 18 Ga. App. 749, 90 S.E.
495 (1916) (postconviction).
The court of appeals ceased hearing habeas appeals after a 1916
state constitutional amendment, 1916 Ga. Laws 19, vested the Georgia
Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction "in all habeas corpus cases."
Thus, after 1916 "the Supreme Court alone ha[d] jurisdiction of writs
of error in habeas corpus cases." Huffman v. Davison, 183 Ga. 391, 392,
188 S.E. 537, 538 (1936).
119. No reported cases can be cited where a habeas proceeding was
instituted before ajudge of a statutory city court, thatjudge's decision
was taken to the superior court on a writ of certiorari, and the decision
of the superior court was then reviewed by the Georgia Supreme Court
on a writ of error. The reporters do not provide sufficient information
to permit us to determine whether, when the Georgia Supreme Court
on a writ of error reviewed a habeas decision of a superior court, the
habeas proceeding had originated in a statutory city court.
120. 62 Ga. 598 (1879).
121. Id. at 604.
122. See Wilkes, A New Role for an Ancient Writ, supra note 2, at 353.
123. Perry, 62 Ga. at 603-04.
that where there is no
It would seem from the authorities ...
such power of review, there may be one writ of habeas corpus after
another ad infinitum. But if there can be a review, is there any
reason, especially in civil cases, in which the struggle is between
party and party, and not with the king or commonwealth on one
side, and the subject or citizen on the other, why the first
adjudication, if acquiesced in, should not be final and conclusive?
Id.
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124. 164 Ga. 7, 137 S.E. 567 (1927); see also Collard v. McCormick,
162 Ga. 116, 117, 132 S.E. 757, 757 (1926); Kirkland v. Canty, 122 Ga.
261, 262, 50 S.E. 90, 90 (1905).
125. 172 Ga. 467, 157 S.E. 639 (1931).
126. Id. at 673-74, 157 S.E. at 642.
A judgment in a habeas-corpus proceeding being in this State
subject to review, is final until reversed; and where the legality of
the same cause of imprisonment is twice drawn in question
between the same parties by successive writs of habeas corpus
before the same court or before different courts of competent
original jurisdiction, the judgment on the former writ may be set
up in bar of a defense to a second habeas-corpus proceeding, such
defense setting up and asserting the legality of the restraint which
had been passed on adversely to the respondent in the first
proceeding. The matter will be deemed res adjudicata as to all
points which were necessarily involved in the general question of
the legality or illegality of the arrest and detention... . We have
found no case in this State dealing with the conclusiveness of a
judgment in a habeas-corpus case discharging a person held under
a sentence in a criminal case. We see no reason why such a
judgment should not be conclusive in such a case. As a judgment
in a habeas-corpus case in which the applicant seeks to be
discharged from restraint under a sentence in a criminal case,
which he asserts is illegal and void, can be reviewed, we see no
reason why the judgment in such a case should not be conclusive
in a case where the State, through one of its officers, is a party and
the applicant for the writ is the other party. In such a case the
same principle should be applicable as in a case where the struggle
is between party and party. We know of no reason which differentiates the conclusiveness of ajudgment in a habeas-corpus case,
wherein the validity of a sentence is involved, from the conclusiveness of a judgment in a habeas corpus case between private
parties.
Id.
127. See, e.g., Turner v. Balkcom, 219 Ga. 48, 49, 131 S.E.2d 563, 564
(1963); Mitchem v. Balkcom, 219 Ga. 47, 47, 131 S.E.2d 562, 562
(1963); Plunkett v. Neal, 201 Ga. 752, 752, 41 S.E.2d 157, 157 (1947).
128. See, e.g., Williams v. Lawrence, 193 Ga. 381, 381, 18 S.E.2d 463,
463 (1942).
129. See, e.g., Sanders v. McHan, 206 Ga. 155, 157-58, 56 S.E.2d 281,
283 (1949).
130. See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
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131. Id.
132. Prior to 1865, it was well-established in Georgia that the writ of
habeas corpus was appropriate to determine child custody issues; see
Wilkes, From Oglethorpe to the Overthrow of the Gonfederacy, supra note 3,
at 1015, 1035, 1040, 1041-42. Since 1978, use of the writ of habeas
corpus to resolve child custody disputes in Georgia has become less
frequent. Under the Georgia Child Custody Intrastate Jurisdiction Act
of 1978, O.C.G.A. §§ 19-9-20 to 19-9-24 (2011), if the child has a legal
custodian-that is, if a parent or other person has been awarded
permanent custody by court order-any proceeding to change the child's
legal custody must be brought in the county of residence of the legal
custodian. Hutto v. Hutto, 250 Ga. 116, 117, 296 S.E.2d 549, 550
(1982). Thus, a habeas proceeding brought in some other county, such
as the county of residence of a person who has physical but not legal
custody of the child, may no longer be used to transfer legal custody of
the child. Indeed, the Act flatly prohibits the writ of habeas corpus
from being be used to change the custody of a child with a legal
custodian, although the legal custodian may use the writ to enforce a
child custody court order. Douglas v. Douglas, 285 Ga. 548, 549, 678
S.E.2d 904, 906 (2009). The 1978 Act does not, however, bar child
custody habeas proceedings where no award of legal custody has been
previously made by a court. Alvarez v. Sills, 258 Ga. 18, 18, 367 S.E.2d
107, 108 (1988); Columbus v. Gaines, 253 Ga. 518, 519, 322 S.E.2d 259,
260 (1984); Johnson v. Smith, 251 Ga. 1, 2, 302 S.E.2d 542, 543 (1983).
133. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 50-121 (1933).
134. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 74-107 (1933) (in cases where custody of
minor child is involved between the parents, there shall be no prima
facie right to the custody of the child in the father); id. § 74-106 (use
of habeas to determine possession of child in case of either separation
of the parents or the death of one parent and the remarriage of the
survivor); id. § 24-2409(2) (habeas court may transfer child custody
cases to the juvenile court for investigation and report back to the
superior court or for investigation and determination). The first of the
Code sections mentioned in the preceding paragraph of this endnote
was derived from 1913 Ga. Laws 110, as amended by 1962 Ga. Laws 71415 and 1957 Ga. Laws 413-14; the second from GA. CODE § 1745
(1861); and the third from 1951 Ga. Laws 298-99.
135. See, e.g., West v. Hatcher, 219 Ga. 540, 540-41, 134 S.E.2d 603,
604 (1964) (grandmother); Eller v. Matthews, 216 Ga. 315, 315, 116
S.E.2d 235, 236 (1960) (uncle); Barber v. Wells, 213 Ga. 1, 3-4, 96
S.E.2d 595, 597 (1957) (mother); Looney v. Martin, 123 Ga. 209, 211,
51 S.E. 304, 305 (1905) (grandfather); Ring v. Weinman, 116 Ga. 798,
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798, 43 S.E. 47, 47 (1902) (father). Sometimes the habeas petition
would be filed by the child's legal guardian. See, e.g., Beaver v.
Williams, 194 Ga. 875, 877, 23 S.E.2d 171, 174 (1942).
136. See, e.g,. Smith v. Scott, 216 Ga. 506, 506, 117 S.E.2d 528, 529
(1960); Camp, 213 Ga. at 65, 97 S.E.2d at 125; Sells v. Sells, 175 Ga. 110,
113-14, 165 S.E. 1, 3 (1932).
137. See, e.g., Ethel Harpst Home, Inc. v. Haithcock, 214 Ga. 297,
297, 104 S.E.2d 459, 459 (1958).
138. See, e.g., Singleton v. Singleton, 216 Ga. 790, 793, 119 S.E.2d
558, 560 (1961); Rourke v. O'Neill, 150 Ga. 282, 103 S.E. 428 (1920).
139. See, e.g., Dutton v. Freeman, 213 Ga. 445, 99 S.E.2d 204 (1957);
Saxon v. Brantley, 174 Ga. 641, 163 S.E. 504 (1932).
140. See, e.g., Duke v. Duke, 181 Ga. 21, 22, 181 S.E. 161, 162 (1935);
Thomas v. Martin, 154 Ga. 696, 696, 115 S.E. 71, 71 (1922).
141. Cooper v. Stephens, 214 Ga. 825, 108 S.E.2d 274 (1959); Dutton,
213 Ga. at 449, 99 S.E.2d at 207; Dwyer v. Krelstein, 211 Ga. 296, 298,
85 S.E.2d 432, 433 (1955); Duncan v. Thomas, 208 Ga. 740, 741, 69
S.E.2d 196, 196-97 (1952); Fielder v. Sadler, 193 Ga. 268, 268, 18 S.E.2d
486, 486 (1942); Girtman v. Girtman, 191 Ga. 173, 173, 11 S.E.2d 782,
782 (1940); Crowell v. Crowell, 190 Ga. 501, 502, 9 S.E.2d 628, 628
(1940).
142. See Wilkes, From Oglethorpeto the Overthrow of the Confederacy, supra

note 2, at 1035-36.
143. 1913 Ga. Laws 110 (codified at GA. CODE § 74-107 (1933)).
144. The rule apparently was grounded in GA. CODE § 1744 (1861),
which, with exceptions, provided that a minor child remained under
the control of the father until reaching the age of majority.
145. See, e.g., Boge v. McCollum, 212 Ga. 741, 742, 95 S.E.2d 665,
666 (1956); Hill v. Rivers, 200 Ga. 354, 357, 37 S.E.2d 386, 388 (1946);
Chapin v. Cummings, 191 Ga. 408, 413, 12 S.E.2d 312, 314 (1940).
146. Lockhart v. Lockhart, 173 Ga. 846, 853, 162 S.E. 129, 132
(1931). The "best interest" test applied in all child custody habeas
proceedings, not just those where the parties were the child's parents.
147. Id. at 853, 162 S.E. at 132. A final judgment in a child custody
habeas case was not res judicata as to a nonparty. McAfee v. Martin,
211 Ga. 14, 14, 83 S.E.2d 605, 606 (1954).
148. Lockhart v. Lockhart, 173 Ga. 853, 162 S.E. 129, 132.
The city-court judge having jurisdiction of the parties and the
subject-matter, his [habeas] judgment awarding the custody of the
child to the respondent was conclusive between the petitioner and
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the respondent until there should be a change in the circumstances that would authorize further proceedings by the court.
Collard v. McCormick, 162 Ga. 116, 125, 132 S.E. 757, 761 (1926).
[A] habeas-corpus court is always open in the interests and for the
protection of children, and its judgment is not conclusive where
the status of the parties has changed ... [I]f one habeas-corpus
court awards the custody of children to their father, and after that
judgment he becomes an unfit and improper person to take
charge of the children, another habeas corpus court would not be
bound by that judgment.
Kirkland, 122 Ga. at 263, 50 S.E. at 90.
149. Lockhart, 173 Ga. at 854, 612 S.E. at 132.
150. Ballenger v. McLain, 54 Ga. 159 (1875); Mitchell v. McElvin, 45
Ga. 558 (1872); Hatcher v. Cutts, 42 Ga. 616 (1871); Alfred v. McKay,
36 Ga. 440 (1867); Adams v. Adams, 36 Ga. 236 (1867); Comas v.
Reddish, 35 Ga. 236 (1866).
151. 1865-66 Ga. Laws 6.

This statute was codified at GA. CODE

§§ 1865-1874 (1868), and GA. CODE §§ 1875-1884 (1873).
152. Ballenger v. McLain, 54 Ga. 159, 160-61 (1875). "The purpose
of this act is humane, just and wise. Humane and just towards the
unprotected minors, and wise in its intention towards the public, in
protecting it against youthful idlers and vagabonds, guaranteeing that
some useful trade or occupation shall be taught the needy young." Id.;
see also Comas, 35 Ga. at 237 ("The spirit of this act is wise, just, and humane ....

").

153. In the first of these cases, decided a year after ratification of the
Thirteenth Amendment, the Court said:
The [apprentice statute] comprehends, alike, the white and black,
without discrimination. It is, moreover, clear and perspicuous, and
should be enforced in good faith; and under color of its provisions, public functionaries should be vigilant in preventing any
one, under the name of master, from getting the control of the
labor and services of such minor apprentice, as if he were still a
slave. It should be borne always in mind, and at all times should regulate
the conduct of the white man, that slavery is with the days beyond the
flood; that it is prohibited by the Constitution of the State of Georgia, and
by that paramount authority, the Constitution of the United States; and
that its continuancewill not by any honestpublicfunctionary be tolerated,
under the forms of law or othenise, directly or indirectly.
Comas, 35 Ga. at 237-38 (emphasis added).
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154. There are important differences between civil contempt and
criminal contempt. Civil contempt is remedial and designed to compel
obedience to an order of a court. A person imprisoned for civil
contempt is entitled to release as soon as the court is obeyed. Criminal
contempt is punitive and its purpose is to punish disobedience to a
court order. Persons imprisoned for criminal contempt are usually
sentenced to a fixed term for their contempt. See generally Davis v.
Davis, 138 Ga. 6, 11-12, 74 S.E. 830, 832 (1912); Hancock v. Kennedy,
22 Ga. App. 144, 144, 95 S.E. 735, 735 (1918).
155. See, e.g., Grimes v. Harvey, 219 Ga. 675, 135 S.E.2d 281 (1964);
Craddock v. Foster, 205 Ga. 534, 54 S.E.2d 406 (1949); Plunkett v.
Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911); Tindall v. Westcott, 113 Ga.
1114, 39 S.E. 450 (1901); Tolleson v. Greene, 83 Ga. 499, 10 S.E. 120
(1889); Smith v. McLendon, 59 Ga. 523 (1877).
156. See, e.g., Grimes, 219 Ga. at 676, 135 S.E.2d at 282; Tolleson, 83
Ga. at 504, 10 S.E. 120 at 121.
157. See, e.g., Lowe v. Taylor, 180 Ga. 654, 180 S.E. 223 (1935).
158. See, e.g., Crosby, 8 Ga. App. at 664, 69 S.E. at 582.
159. See, e.g., Foster v. Withrow, 201 Ga. 260, 39 S.E.2d 466 (1946);
Rhodes v. Pearce, 189 Ga. 623, 7 S.E.2d 251 (1940); Young v. Fain, 121
Ga. 737, 49 S.E. 731 (1905).
160. See, e.g., Allen v. Harris, 40 Ga. 220 (1869).
161. See, e.g., Shiflett v. Dobson, 180 Ga. 23, 177 S.E. 681 (1934);
Dickson v. Hicks, 160 Ga. 487, 128 S.E. 770 (1925); Reagan v. Powell,
125 Ga. 89, 53 S.E. 580 (1906); Allen v. Barnwell, 120 Ga. 537, 48 S.E.
176 (1904).

162. See Wood v. Wood, 84 Ga. 102, 106, 10 S.E. 501, 501 (1889)
("Since the abolition of imprisonment for debt by the constitutions of
1868 and 1877

. . . ").

163. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 107-203 (1933).
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Coleman, 154 Ga. at 853, 115 S.E. at 641; Nash v.
Mangum, 141 Ga. 648, 649, 81 S.E. 883, 884 (1914); Harper v. Terry,
139 Ga. 763, 763, 78 S.E. 175, 175 (1913); Bass v. Hightower, 94 Ga.
602, 602, 21 S.E. 592, 592 (1894); State ex rel. Lynch v. Bridges, 64 Ga.
146, 155 (1879); Peny, 62 Ga. at 601-02; Harris v. Bridges, 57 Ga. 407,
407 (1876). In one of these cases, Perry v. McLendon, a 65-year old
widow and her 18-year old daughter-in-law, co-defendants in a bail

trover action, were jailed for a year and a half.
166. See, e.g., Harris,57 Ga. at 408.
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167. Id.
168. 1878-79 Ga. Laws 144. An 1893 act made decisions under the
1878 act appealable to the Georgia Supreme Court via a writ of error.
1893 Ga. Laws 50. Both statutes were codified in the 1895, 1910, and
1933 Georgia Codes; see, e.g., GA. CODE §§ 107-205, 107-206 (1933).
169. Bass, 94 Ga. at 602, 21 S.E. at 592. For case law under the 1878
statute, see, e.g., Harper v. Jeffers, 139 Ga. 756, 759, 78 S.E. 172, 173
(1913); Shinholster v. Jordan, 115 Ga. 462, 41 S. E. 610 (1902); Wyatt
v. Citizens' & S.Bank, 29 Ga. App. 528, 116 S.E. 34 (1923).
170. See, e.g., Terry, 139 Ga. 763, 764, 78 S.E. 175, 176 (1913).
171. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 82-204 (1933).
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., Nash, 141 Ga. at 648, 81 S.E. at 883; Turner, 17 Ga.
App. 257, 257, 86 S.E. 460, 460 (1915).
174. For a discussion of the use, across the nation, of state habeas
corpus to resist interstate extradition, see Note, Extradition Habeas
Corpus, 74 YALE L.J. 78 (1964); Note, Scope of a Habeas Corpus Hearingon
InterstateExtraditionof Criminals,53 YALE L.J. 359 (1964). For discussion
of the pre-1965 use of the state writ of habeas corpus in Georgia to
resist extradition to another state, see Henry G. Neal, Interstate Criminal
Extraditions,24 GA. B.J. 219 (1964).
175. RONALD P. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPus 47 (1969). Ordinaries having been statutorily prohibited from hearing extradition habeas
cases since 1885, all the reported Georgia habeas cases involving
extradition were instituted before either a superior courtjudge see, e.g.,
Rex v. Aldredge, 191 Ga. 638, 13 S.E.2d 665 (1941), or a city court
judge, see, e.g., Mainer v. Plunkett, 216 Ga. 820, 120 S.E.2d 175 (1961).
176. "A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other
Crime, who shall flee fromJustice, and be found in another State, shall
on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled,
be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the
Crime." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
177. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (2006). Except for a few minor alterations,
this statute "remains virtually unchanged from the original version
enacted in 1793." Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 287 n.6 (1978).
Prior to 1948, the statute was codified at U.S. REV. STAT. § 5278.
Essentially, the statute provides:
Whenever the executive authority of a state ...

demands any

person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any
State ...

to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of

an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate ...
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charging the person demanded with having committed treason,
felony or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or
chief magistrate of the State from whence the person so charged
has fled, the executive authority of the State ... to which such
person has fled shall cause him to be arrested and secured . . .
and shall cause the fugitive to be delivered to [the] agent of the
executive authority of [the demanding state].
Id.

178. These statutes were included in every one of the Georgia Codes
adopted from 1861 to 1933. See GA. CODE §§ 44-302 to -305 (1933); GA.
PEN. CODE §§ 1354-1356 (1910); GA. PEN. CODE §§ 1271-1274 (1895);
GA. CODE §§ 54-57 (1882); GA. CODE §§ 54-57 (1873); GA. CODE
§§ 57-60 (1868); GA. CODE §§ 61-64 (1861).
In essence, these four statutes provided: (1) it was the duty of the
governor, upon the demand of the executive of another state, to cause
the arrest and the deliverance of any fugitive from justice, upon
demand by the executive of any other state, in the manner prescribed
by the laws and Constitution of the United States; (2) the governor was
to suspend delivery of a fugitive from justice if the fugitive was under
prosecution for violating the laws of Georgia; (3) if a fugitive from
justice charged with crime in another state fled to Georgia and was
arrested, it was the duty of the governor to issue a warrant for the
fugitive's arrest and to direct that the fugitive be imprisoned for as long
as twenty days if the governor of the other state had not yet made a
formal demand for extradition; (4) when the governor issued an
extradition arrest warrant, it was the duty of Georgia law enforcement
officials to execute it.
179. GA. CODE § 50-118 (1933). This Code section was included in
the habeas corpus chapter, article, or title of each of the Georgia Codes
from 1861 to 1933; GA. PEN. CODE § 1309 (1910); GA. PEN. CODE
§ 1228 (1895); GA. CODE § 4025 (1882); GA. CODE § 4025 (1873); GA.
CODE § 3949 (1868); GA. CODE § 3926 (1861).
180. See generally, Comment, The Limits of Constitutional Inquiry on
Habeas Corpus in Interstate Rendition, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 735 (1954).

181. See, e.g., Mayfield v. Hornsby, 199 Ga. 70, 70,33 S.E.2d 312, 312
(1945); Dawson v. Smith, 150 Ga. 352, 352, 103 S.E. 847, 848 (1920);
Barranger,103 Ga. at 473, 30 S.E. at 528.
182. See, e.g., Blackwell v. Jennings, 128 Ga. 264, 264, 57 S.E. 484,
484 (1907); Barranger,103 Ga. at 465, 473, 30 S.E. at 525, 528.
183. See, e.g., Brown v. Lowry, 185 Ga. 539, 539-40, 195 S.E. 759, 760
(1937); Kelly v. Mangum, 145 Ga. 57, 58, 88 S.E. 556, 557 (1916).
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184. See, e.g., Williams v. Sipple, 178 Ga. 62, 62, 172 S.E. 62, 63
(1933).
185. See, e.g., Scheinfain v. Aldredge, 198 Ga. 51, 54, 12 S.E.2d 868,
872 (1941); Dobbs v. Anderson, 170 Ga. 826, 827, 154 S.E. 342, 343
(1930).
186. See, e.g., Ellis v. Grimes, 98 Ga. 51, 54, 30 S.E.2d 912, 924
(1944); Broyles v. Mount, 197 Ga. 659, 660, 30 S.E.2d 48, 49 (1944);
Hart v. Mount, 196 Ga. 452, 454, 26 S.E.2d 453, 455 (1943).
187. 188 U.S. 691, 711 (1903).
188. Dawson, 150 Ga. at 352-53, 103 S.E. at 848.
189. Deering v. Mount, 194 Ga. 833, 840-41, 22 S.E.2d 828, 832
(1942); see also Denny v. Foster, 204 Ga. 872, 873-74, 52 S.E.2d 596, 597
(1949) (affidavit sworn to in demanding state before notary public was
insufficient to authorize extradition). Deering relied on Compton v.
Alabama, 214 U.S. 1 (1909), where the United States Supreme Court
held that the federal extradition statute does not require a governor to
issue an extradition arrest warrant, unless the demanding state shows
that the person to be extradited has been charged with crime in the
demanding state by either an affidavit before a magistrate or by an
indictment. Deering, 194 Ga. at 838, 22 S.E.2d at 828.
190. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
191. In 1955, the Georgia legislature amended the Uniform Extradition Act. 1955 Ga. Laws 587. The 1955 statute also repealed GA. CODE
§ 44-303 (1933), under which the governor was to suspend delivery of
a fugitive from justice if the fugitive was under prosecution for violating
the laws of Georgia. The repealed statute, § 44-303, was the second of
the four state extradition statutes which had appeared in consecutive
order in every Georgia Code from 1861 to 1933; see supra note 178 and
accompanying text.
192. Where the federal extradition statute is basically a system of
"executive demand and executive surrender," Note, The Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1411, 1412 (1932), the
Uniform Act involves the judiciary in the extradition process. Generally, the extradition machinery furnished by the Uniform Act is broader
in scope and procedurally more effective than the procedure under the
federal extradition statute. For example, under the Uniform Act, but
not under the federal statute, alleged fugitives may be arrested in the
asylum state even though they have not yet been charged with crime in
the state from which they fled and even though their extradition has
not yet been demanded. Furthermore, unlike the federal statute, the
Act not only permits, under certain circumstances, the extradition of
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persons who were not physically present in the demanding state at the
time the crime was committed, but also specifically forbids the asylum
state from inquiring into the guilt or innocence of the person whose
extradition is sought.
Generally, the Uniform Act is the extradition procedure used in the
more than forty states which have adopted the Act, and the federal
extradition statute procedure is used in the states which have not
adopted the Act. See Heny G. Neal, Interstate CriminalExtraditions, 24
GA. B.J. 219, 220 (1964).
193. Id. at 224.
194. See, e.g., House, 214 Ga. at 574, 105 S.E.2d at 747 (declining to
adopt narrow interpretation of "fugitive from justice"); Williams v.
Grimes, 214 Ga. 302, 302, 104 S.E.2d 460, 460 (1958) ("Where it is
shown in a habeas corpus case that the respondent holds the petitioner
in custody under an executive warrant which is regular on its face, the
presumption is that the governor has complied with the Constitution
and law, and the burden is cast upon the petitioner to show some valid
and sufficient reason why the warrant should not be executed");
Mathews v. Foster, 209 Ga. 699, 699, 75 S.E.2d 427, 428 (1953) (courts
of this state may not inquire into guilt or innocence of person to be
extradited.).
The Court in Mathews recalled its reasoning in Blackwell.
When, in the trial of a habeas corpus case, it appears that the
respondent holds the petitioner in custody under an executive
warrant based upon an extradition proceeding, and the warrant is
regular on its face, the burden is cast upon the petitioner to show
some valid and sufficient reason why the warrant should not be
executed; the presumption is that the governor has complied with
the Constitution and the law, and this presumption continues until
the contrary appears.
Mathews, 209 Ga. at 700, 75 S.E.2d at 428-29 (quoting Blackwell, 128 Ga.
at 264, 57 S.E. at 484).
195. See, e.g., Watson v. Grimes, 218 Ga. 631, 633, 129 S.E.2d 795,
797 (1963) (the extradition warrant purports to be issued under the
federal extradition statute, not the Uniform Act; relief granted because
the documents in support of the requested extradition conclusively
show that the crime was committed in Georgia, not the demanding
state, and therefore the habeas petitioner is not a fugitive from justice
under the federal statute); Brown v. Grimes, 214 Ga. 388, 391, 104
S.E.2d 907, 909-10 (1958) (granting relief because, in violation of
federal extradition statute, there was no formal demand for the habeas
petitioner's extradition, and because the documents in support of the
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extradition request show that no crime was committed); West v.
Graham, 211 Ga. 662, 664-65, 87 S.E.2d 849, 850-51 (1955) (granting
relief because, in violation of federal extradition statute, there was no
copy of indictment or of an affidavit made before a magistrate); Jackson
v. Pittard, 211 Ga. 427, 428, 86 S.E.2d 295, 296 (1955) (holding that
where extradition proceeding was under federal extradition statute
rather than Uniform Act, relief granted on grounds habeas petitioner
was not "fugitive from justice," because it was conclusively established
that he was not in demanding state at the time alleged crime was
committed); McFarlin v. Shirley, 209 Ga. 794, 800, 76 S.E.2d 1 (1953)
(granting relief because, in violation of federal extradition statute, there
was no copy of indictment or of an affidavit made before a magistrate).
196. Jackson v. Maner, 95 Ga. 702, 704, 22 S.E. 705, 706 (1895).
197. Wright, 5 Ga. App. at 299, 63 S.E. at 48.
198. Id.
199. GA. CODE

§§ 585-594 (1861).

200. Wright, 5 Ga. App. at 299, 63 S.E. at 48.
201. 1891 Ga. Laws 135.
202. Wright, 5 Ga. App. at 299, 63 S.E. at 48.
203. 1896 Ga. Laws 78.
204. See Wright, 5 Ga. App. at 300, 63 S.E. at 48. Imprisonment of
defaulters under the "stick and dirt" system was first authorized by 186566 Ga. Laws 23, which amended GA. CODE § 594 (1861). The imprisonment provision was codified at GA. CODE § 658 (1868); GA. CODE § 619
(1873); GA. CODE § 619 (1882); GA. CODE § 539 (1895); GA. CODE
§ 660 (1910); GA. CODE § 95-420 (1933).
205. 1891 Ga. Laws 137. The chain gang punishment provision for
defaulters under the "alternative road law" was codified at GA. CODE
§ 580 (1895); GA. CODE § 701 (1910); GA. CODE § 95-808 (1933).
206. See Etheridge v. Poston, 176 Ga. 388, 168 S.E. 25; Westmoreland
v. Whelchel, 170 Ga. 525, 153 S.E. 360 (1930); Singleton v. Holmes, 70
Ga. 407 (1883); Davis, 7 Ga. App. 192, 66 S.E. 401; Wright, 5 Ga. App.
298, 63 S.E. 48. In Etheridge and Westmoreland the habeas petitioners
were confined on a chain gang.
207. Etheridge, 176 Ga. at 388, 168 S.E. at 25; Davis, 7 Ga. App. at
195, 66 S.E. 403.
208. See, e.g., White v. George, 195 Ga. 465, 468, 24 S.E.2d 787, 789
(1943); Hall v. Martin, 177 Ga. 238, 241, 170 S.E. 41, 42 (1933); Pullen
v. Cleckler, 162 Ga. 111, 116, 132 S.E. 761, 763 (1926); Drane v.
Childers, 18 Ga. App. 282, 282, 89 S.E. 304, 306 (1916).
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209. See, e.g., Brooks v. Sturdivant, 127 Ga. 514, 518, 170 S.E. 369,
372 (1933).
210. GA. CODE § 50-116 (1933) (habeas relief not to be granted if
"the party is in custody for contempt, and the court has not exceeded
its jurisdiction in the length of the imprisonment").
211. Constantino v. Warren, 285 Ga. 851, 853, 684 S.E.2d 601, 604
(2009). "[This] Court concluded that the applicable statutes at that
time entitled persons who had committed non-capital felonies to bail
as a matter of right." Id. See, e.g., Reid, 267 Ga. at 29, 60 S.E.2d at 154;
Dickey v. Morris, 166 Ga. 140, 142, 142 S.E. 557, 557 (1928); Newsome
v. Scott, 151 Ga. 639, 644, 107 S.E. 854, 856.
212. See Reid, 207 Ga. at 29, 60 S.E.2d at 154.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., id.; Sanders v. Paschal, 186, Ga. 837, 199 S.E. 153
(1938); Bishop v. Wilbanks, 161 Ga. 305, 130 S.E. 819 (1923). But see
Dickey, 166 Ga. 140, 142 S.E. 557; Maddox v. Cowart, 155 Ga. 606, 118
S.E. 39 (1923); Newsome, 151 Ga. 639, 107 S.E. 854.
216. Smith v. State, 203 Ga. 636, 636, 47 S.E.2d 866, 867 (1948).
217. Jones, 219 Ga. at 586, 134 S.E.2d at 791; Hodges v. Balkcom,
209 Ga. 856, 857, 76 S.E.2d 798, 800 (1953); Allen v. Pratt, 87 Ga. App.
704, 705, 75 S.E.2d 329, 330 (1953). This right was created in 1922.
1922 Ga. Laws 51.
218. Jones, 219 Ga. at 588-89, 134 S.E.2d at 790, 793.
219. One reason for this was a section which appeared in each of
the Georgia Codes from 1861 to 1933 and prohibited habeas relief for
persons "imprisoned under lawful process issued by a court of
competent jurisdiction," persons imprisoned under irregular warrants
which nonetheless "substantially conform[ed] to the requirements of
[the] Code, or persons imprisoned under a bench warrant regular
upon its face." See, e.g., GA. CODE § 50-116 (1933). Another reason was
another Code section which also appeared in each of these Codes and
which barred habeas relief to a person detained on criminal charges
under a defective affidavit or warrant, provided there was probable
cause for his detention. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 50-117 (1933).
220. Holders, 141 Ga. at 218, 80 S.E. at 715.
221. Stephens, 120 Ga. at 220, 47 S.E. at 499.
222. See, e.g., Tollison v. George, 153 Ga. 612, 617-18, 112 S.E. 896,
898 (1922) (granting relief because warrant under which the habeas
petitioner was arrested was based upon an affidavit alleging acts which
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did not amount to a violation of the statute under which petitioner was
charged); Sell v. Turner, 138 Ga. 106, 106, 74 S.E. 783, 783 (1912)
(granting relief because undisputed evidence showed that statute under
which habeas petitioner was charged was inapplicable to his conduct);
Hudson v. Jennings, 134 Ga. 373, 374, 67 S.E. 1037, 1037 (1910)
(granting relief because of unconscionable alteration and manipulation
of charges against habeas petitioner by municipal court judge);
Dominick v. Bowdoin, 44 Ga. 357, 358 (1871) (holding that habeas
court erred in refusing to receive pretrial pardon as evidence in habeas
proceeding brought by petitioner in custody awaiting trial on the
charges for which he had been pardoned).
223. See, e.g., Harris v. Whittle, 190 Ga. 850, 850, 10 S.E.2d 926, 927
(1940); Jackson v. Lowry, 170 Ga. 755, 756 154 S.E. 228, 228-29 (1930);
Peebles v. Mangum, 142 Ga. at 701, 83 S.E. at 523; Holder, 141 Ga. at
218, 80 S.E. at 715.
224. See, e.g., Pennaman v. Walton, 220 Ga. 295, 298, 138 S.E.2d 571,
573 (1964); Harris v. Norris, 188 Ga. 610, 611-12, 4 S.E.2d 840, 840
(1939); Pascha, 186 Ga. at 837, 199 S.E. at 153; Manor v. Donahoo, 117
Ga. 304, 304, 43 S.E. 719, 719 (1903); see also Milton, 149 Ga. at 29-30,
98 S.E. at 608 (alleged disqualification of grand jury that indicted
habeas petitioner not basis for pretrial habeas relief).
225. See, e.g., Paulk v. Sexton, 203 Ga. 82, 82, 45 S.E.2d 768, 772
(1947); Peebles, 142 Ga. at 701, 83 S.E. at 522-23.
226. See, e.g., Stephens v. Henderson, 120 Ga. 218, 220, 47 S.E. 498,
499 (1904).
227. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Jones, 209 Ga. 758, 764, 75 S.E.2d 815, 819
(1953) (granting relief because habeas petitioner charged in municipal
court with violating void ordinance); Reid, 207 Ga. at 28, 60 S.E.2d at
153; Henderson v. Heyward, 109 Ga. 373, 381, 34 S.E. 590, 593 (1899)
(granting relief because habeas petitioner was charged in municipal
court with violating void ordinance).
228. A criminal defendant is convicted when he is found guilty by
either the jury or (in a bench trial) by the judge, or when he pleads
guilty. Thus, a conviction is a finding of guilt. A conviction must be
distinguished from a sentence, which is the order or pronouncement
of the court fixing the punishment to be imposed on a defendant who
has been convicted.
229. In 1967, two years after end of the period of a century covered
in this Article, the Georgia legislature enacted the Georgia Habeas
Corpus Act of 1967, 1967 Ga. Laws 835, which, as amended, is now
codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 9-14-1(c), 9-14-40 to 9-14-53 (2006 & Supp.
2012). The 1967 statute modernized and greatly expanded the
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availability of postconviction habeas relief.

230. See, e.g., Sanders v. Aldredge, 198 Ga. 69, 69, 5 S.E.2d 371, 371
(1939) (discharge granted where indictment failed to allege an
offense).
231. See, e.g., Day, 172 Ga. at 475, 157 S.E. at 643 (habeas petitioner
properly discharged from restraint under certain void sentences, but
should have been remanded to custody of sheriff holding arrest
warrants on other charges); Wells, 101 Ga. at 145, 28 S.E. 642 ("The
verdict and judgment rendered in superior court when the judge of the
city court was presiding affords no legal reason for detaining in custody
the person against whom they were rendered; but as the record shows
that the sheriff has the accused in custody, and has also in his hands
the bench-warrant originally issued against him in the case, the judge
did not err in refusing to discharge the accused upon the hearing of
the habeas corpus").
232. See, e.g., Heard v. Gill, 204 Ga. 261, 261, 49 S.E.2d 656, 657
(1948)

("a defendant

...

may, when a void sentence has been

imposed, be returned before the proper court in order that a legal
sentence may be imposed upon him in accordance with law"); Whittle
v.Jones, 198 Ga. 545, 32 S.E.2d 94, 99 (1944) (habeas petitioner stands
convicted of a crime, and if the sentence that was passed was void, "the
proper procedure

..

. would have been to remand him to be

sentenced for his crime"); Littlejohn v. Stells, 123 Ga. 427, 430, 51 S.E.
390, 391 (1905) (habeas petitioner sentenced to punishment in excess
of legal maximum should be taken before convicting court for
resentencing).
233. See, e.g., Day, 173 Ga. at 473, 157 S.E. at 642 (except in capital
cases, ordinary had authority to grant relief to person convicted in
superior court); Simmons, 117 Ga. at 308, 43 S.E. at 481 (city court
judge may grant relief to person convicted in a superior court); McBride,
16 Ga. App. at 242-43, 85 S.E. at 88 (city court judge properly granted
relief to person convicted in a superior court).
234. See Wilkes, A New Role for an Ancient Writ, supra note 2, at 336.
235. See generally id. at 336-38.
236. Id.
237. See, e.g., Plocar v. Foster, 211 Ga. 153, 153, 84 S.E.2d 360, 361
(1954) ("Where a person charged with a criminal offense has been
sentenced by a court havingjurisdiction of the person of the defendantand
of the offense charged," habeas corpus cannot be used) (emphasis
added); Clark, 185 Ga. 328, 330, 195 S.E. 166, 167 (1938) ("The general
rule is that ajudgment of a court havingjurisdiction of the offense and

294

JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN LEGAL HISTORY

the party chargedwith its commission is not open to collateral attack.")
(emphasis added); Pridgeon, 154 Ga. at 399-400, 114 S.E. at 357 ("When
the court has jurisdiction by law of the offense and the offender, its
judgments are, in general, not nullities ....
The general rule is that
the judgment of a court having jurisdiction of the offense and the party
chargedwith its commission is not open to collateral attack.") (emphasis
added).
238. See Wilkes, Postconviction Habeas Corpus Relief in Georgia, supra
note 2, at 250-51 nn.2, 3.
239. Id. On the other hand, if a claim of lack of personal jurisdiction had been raised on direct review but decided against the defendant, it would be barred in a habeas proceeding under the resjudicata
doctrine. See infra note 277 and accompanying text. As a practical
matter, therefore, the only way to successfully raise a claim of lack of
personal jurisdiction after conviction was on direct review by appeal,
certiorari, or writ of error. See, e.g., Chow Bing Kew v. United States,
248 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1957) (on direct appeal, conviction reversed
due to lack of in personam jurisdiction over the defendant); Russell v.
State, 349 So. 2d 1224, 1226 (Fla. App. 1977) (same).
240. See, e.g., Mathis v. Rowland, 208 Ga. 571, 571, 67 S.E. 760, 76061 (1951); Gibson, 204 Ga. at 717, 51 S.E.2d at 666; Clarke v. Johnson,
199 Ga. 163, 167, 33 S.E.2d 425, 428 (1945); see also Grant v. Camp, 105
Ga. 628, 631-32, 31 S.E. 429, 430 (1898) (statute conferring on
convicting court jurisdiction over the offense charged was unconstitutional; habeas relief granted).
241. See, e.g., White v. Hornsby, 191 Ga. 462, 463, 12 S.E.2d 875, 876
(1941); Moore v. Wheeler, 35 S.E. 116 (1900); see also Lowry v.
Herndon, 182 Ga. 582, 583, 186 S.E. 429, 430 (1936) (state criminal
statute under which habeas petitioner was convicted and sentenced did
not violate federal constitutional free speech and freedom of assembly
protections; nor did it violate federal constitutional protections against
vague criminal statutes), rev'd, Herndon v. Lowly, 301 U.S. 242, 263-64
(1937).
242. See, e.g., Griffin v. Eaves, 114 Ga. 65, 66, 39 S.E. 913, 914
(1901).
243. See, e.g., Giles v. Gibson, 208 Ga. 850, 852, 69 S.E.2d 774, 776
(1952); Griffin v. Smith, 184 Ga. at 871, 193 S.E. at 778; Marshall 173
Ga. at 782, 161 S.E. at 622; Smith v. Chapman, 166 Ga. 479, 480, 143
S.E. 422, 422 (1928); Landford v. Alfriend, 147 Ga. 799, 799-800, 95 S.E.
688, 688 (1918); Snope v. Dixon, 147 Ga. 285, 286, 93 S.E. 399, 400
(1917); Mayo v. Williams, 146 Ga. 650, 652, 92 S.E. 59, 60 (1917);
Duren v. Stephens, 126 Ga. 496, 497-98, 54 S.E. 1045, 1045 (1906);
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Collins v. Hall, 92 Ga. 411, 411, 17 S.E. 622, 622 (1893).
244. See, e.g., McCain, 221 Ga. at 359, 144 S.E.2d 522,524; McDonald
v. Sowell, 129 Gaa. 242, 243, 58 S.E. 860, 861 (1907). See also Thompson v. Aldredge, 187 Ga. 467, 200 S.E. 799 (1939) (relief granted). But
see Foster,211 Ga. at 153, 84 S.E.2d at 361; Strickland v. Thompson, 155

Ga. 125, 126-27, 116 S.E. 593, 594 (1923).
245. Stroup v. Pruden, 104 Ga. 721, 722, 30 S.E. 948, 949 (1898).
246. Newton, 101 Ga. at 145, 28 S.E. at 642.
247. Roberson v. Balkcom, 212 Ga. 603, 603, 94 S.E.2d 720, 721
(1956).
248. Webb v. Henlery, 209 Ga. 447, 449, 74 S.E.2d 7 (1953).
249. See, e.g., Littlejohn, 123 Ga. at 630, 51 S.E. at 391 (municipal
court had authority to sentence habeas petitioner to imprisonment, but
not to sentence him to the chain gang); see also Balkcom v. Defore, 219
Ga. 641, 643, 135 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1964) (after habeas petitioner was
convicted of a single offense, court could not impose five separate,
consecutive imprisonment sentences).
250. See, e.g., Morris v. Clark, 156 Ga. 489, 489, 119 S.E. 303, 303
(1923) (indeterminate sentence statute required convicting court to
sentence habeas petitioner to a term of imprisonment within the
maximum and minimum limits of the punishment prescribed by law for
the offense, but superior court sentenced petitioner to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment which was within the statutory maximum but below the statutory minimum for the offense; habeas relief
granted).
251. Pridgen, 154 Ga. at 400, 114 S.E. at 357.
252. See, e.g., Morris v. Peacock, 202 Ga. 524, 528-29, 43 S.E.2d 531,
534 (1947); Stroup v. Mount, 197 Ga. 804, 806, 30 S.E.2d 477, 478
(1944).
253. See, e.g., Smith, 205 Ga. at 410-11, 54 S.E.2d at 274; Wilcoxon, 182

Ga. at 637, 15 S.E.2d at 876.
254. See Wilkes, Postconviction Habeas Corpus Relief in Georgia (PartI),
supra note 2, at 349.

255. From the 1930s until the 1960s the constitutional right to
counsel was commonly regarded as protected by both right to counsel
provisions and by due process protections. A violation of the right to
counsel was often considered a species of due process violation, and
therefore a violation of the right to counsel was frequently described by
courts, including the federal courts and the Georgia courts, as a due
process violation. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
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256. 188 Ga. 607, 4 S.E.2d 469 (1939).
257. Id. at 608, 4 S.E.2d at 469 (emphasis added). This passage was
quoted approvingly one month later in Sanders v. Aldredge, 189 Ga. at
69, 5 S.E.2d at 372.
258. See Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 24 (1939) ("But if it be
found that the court had no jurisdiction to try the petitioner, or that in
its proceedings his constitutional rights have been denied, the remedy
of habeas corpus is available.").
259. Williams, 188 Ga. at 608-09, 4 S.E.2d at 469-70.
260. Id. at 470.
261. 192 Ga. 636, 15 S.E.2d 873 (1941).
262. Id. at 639, 15 S.E.2d at 877 ("The deprivation of counsel is such
a fundamental and radical error that it operates to render the trial
illegal and void. It follows that the charge that the applicant was denied
the benefit of counsel, if meritorious, constituted a ground for issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus.").
263. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
264. Id. at 468 ("If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not
complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed.").
265. Wilcoxon, 192 Ga. at 639, 15 S.E.2d at 877.
266. It should be kept in mind that Johnson involved a noncapital
crime, whereas Wilcoxon was a death sentence case.
267. See, e.g., Gardner, 220 Ga. 352, 139 S.E.2d 129; Balkcom v.
Williams, 220 Ga. 359, 138 S.E.2d 873 (1964); Balkcom v. Vickers, 220
Ga. 345, 138 S.E.2d 868 (1964); Sims v. Balkcom, 220 Ga. 7, 136 S.E.2d
766 (1964); Balkcom v. Turner, 217 Ga. 610, 123 S.E.2d 918 (1962);
Fair,216 Ga. 721, 119 S.E.2d 691.
268. See, e.g., Turner, 217 Ga. at 611, 123 S.E.2d at 919; Fair v.
Balkcom, 216 Ga. at 727, 119 S.E.2d 695; see also Dutton v. Mims, 223
Ga. at 423-24, 156 S.E.2d at 94.
269. See, e.g., Jones v. Balkcom, 210 Ga. 262, 79 S.E.2d 1 (1953);
Smith, 205 Ga. 408, 54 S.E.2d 272; Coates v. Lawrence, 193 Ga. 368, 18
S.E.2d 685 (1942); Wilcoxon, 192 Ga. 634, 19 S.E.2d 499; see also Aldredge,
188 Ga. 607, 4 S.E.2d 469.
270. See, e.g., Smith v. Balkcom, 202 Ga. 524, 54 S.E.2d 272 (1949);
Morris v. Peacock, 205 Ga. 408, 43 S.E.2d 531 (1947).
271. Wilcoxon, 192 Ga. at 639, 15 S.E.2d at 876-77.
272. 124 Ga. 701, 52 S.E. 751 (1906).
273. Id. at 713, 52 S.E. at 757.

GEORGIA HABEAS CORPUS

297

274. See supra notes 252-54, 270-71 and accompanying text. There
was also deemed to be a waiver of rights for habeas purposes if the
habeas petitioner had been convicted after entering a valid plea of
guilty. See, e.g., Bradford v. Mills, 208 Ga. 198, 198, 66 S.E.2d 58, 59
(1951); Jackson v. Lowry, 171 Ga. 349, 351, 155 S.E. 466, 467 (1930).
275. See supra notes 120-29 and accompanying text.
276. See, e.g., Turner v. Balkcom, 219 Ga. at 49, 131 S.E.2d at 564;
Mitchem, 219 Ga. at 47-48, 131 S.E.2d at 562; Andrews, 201 Ga. at 137, 39
S.E.2d at 65; Day, 172 Ga. at 474, 157 S.E. at 643
277. See, e.g., Moore v. Burnett, 215 Ga. 146, 147, 109 S.E.2d 605,
606 (1959); White, 191 Ga. at 463-64, 12 S.E.2d at 876; Blackstone v.
Nelson, 151 Ga. 706, 707-08, 108 S.E. 114,115 (1921); Lynn v. Flanders,
141 Ga. 500, 500, 81 S.E. 205, 205 (1914); Eaves, 114 Ga. at 67, 39 S.E.
at 914.
278. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Balkcom, 205 Ga. 445, 447, 53 S.E.2d 680,
681 (1949).
279. See, e.g., Balkcom v. Craton, 220 Ga. 216, 218, 138 S.E.2d 163,
164 (1964); Mullenix v. Balkcom, 213 Ga. 490, 490, 99 S.E.2d 832, 893
(1957).
280. See, e.g., Plocar, 211 Ga. at 153, 84 S.E.2d at 361; McKay v.
Balkcom, 203 Ga. 790, 790, 48 S.E.2d 453, 453 (1948); Aldredge, 189 Ga.
at 69, 5 S.E.2d at 372; Fleming v. Lowry, 173 Ga. 894, 894-95, 162 S.E.
144, 144 (1931); Strickland, 155 Ga. at 126, 116 S.E. 594; Wells, 154 Ga.
at 399, 114 S.E. at 356; Blackstone, 151 Ga. at 707, 108 S.E. at 115;
Harrell v. Avera, 139 Ga. 340, 340, 77 S.E. 160, 160 (1913); Cross, 17
Ga. App. at 802, 88 S.E. at 594; Davis, 7 Ga. App. at 195, 66 S.E. at 403.
281. See, e.g., Brieswick v. Brunswick, 51 Ga. at 642.
282. See, e.g., Carter v. Johnson, 168 Ga. 688, 689, 148 S.E. 590, 590
(1929); Alexander v. Walton, 151 Ga. 645, 648, 107 S.E. 862, 863
(1921); Cooley v. Dixon, 149 Ga. 506, 506, 101 S.E. 181, 181 (1919);
Dixon v. Baughn, 149 Ga. 86, 87-88, 99 S.E. 34, 34 (1919); Gordon v.
Marshal, 126 Ga. 584, 584-85, 55 S.E. 489, 489 (1906); Dunaway v.
Hodge, 127 Ga. 690, 692-93, 55 S.E. 483, 484 (1906); Maples, 10 Ga.
App. at 141, 72 S.E. at 933.
283. See, e.g., Pridgeon, 168 Ga. at 770, 149 S.E. at 48, 49; Long v.
Collier, 154 Ga. 673, 674, 115 S.E. 9, 10 (1922); Williams v. Mize, 72 Ga.
129, 130-31 (1883); Howard, 12 Ga. App. at 354, 77 S.E. at 192.
284. See, e.g., Cox v. Lanier, 133 Ga. 682, 683-84, 66 S.E. 799, 799-800
(1909). At the time the Georgia Penal Code provided that in criminal
prosecutions for fornication or adultery, the prosecution and the
punishment could at any time be prevented or suspended if the parties
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lawfully married. Id.
285. See, e.g., Balkcom v.Jackson, 219 Ga. 59, 61, 131 S.E.2d 551, 553
(1963); Wimbish v. Reece, 170 Ga. 64, 64-65, 152 S.E. 97, 97 (1930);
Teasley v. Nelson, 164 Ga. 242, 246, 138 S.E. 72, 74 (1927); Fortson, 117
Ga. at 151, 43 S.E. at 492-93; see also Goble, 214 Ga. at 699, 107 S.E.2d
at 177 (habeas corpus is a proper remedy where prisoner contends that
he has executed the sentence or sentences imposed).
286. See, e.g., Tatum, 104 Ga. at 333, 30 S.E. at 813.
287. See, e.g., Morgan v. Foster, 208 Ga. 630, 631, 68 S.E.2d 583, 584
(1952); Lester v. Foster, 207 Ga. 596, 597, 63 S.E.2d 402, 402 (1951);
Balkcom v. Gunn, 206 Ga. 167, 170, 56 S.E.2d 482, 484 (1949); Smith
v. Veach, 165 Ga. 190, 190, 140 S.E. 356, 356 (1927); Plunkett v. Miller,
161 Ga. 466, 466, 131 S.E. 170, 171 (1925).
288. See, e.g., Balkcom v. Sellers, 219 Ga. 662, 662, 135 S.E.2d 414,
414 (1964); Childers v. Goble, 211 Ga. 860, 861, 89 S.E.2d 499, 500
(1955); Crider v. Balkcom, 204 Ga. 480, 480, 50 S.E.2d 321, 321 (1948).
289. See, e.g., Harrell v. Mount, 193 Ga. 818, 20 S.E.2d 69 (1942);
Pippin v. Johnson, 192 Ga. 450, 15 S.E.2d 712 (1941); Allman v.
Aldredge, 192 Ga. 431, 15 S.E.2d 710 (1941); Muckle v. Clarke, 191 Ga.
202, 12 S.E.2d 339 (1940); see also Pappas v. Aldredge, 192 Ga. 482, 15
S.E.2d 718 (1941) (habeas claim relating to condition precedent to
pardon); Huff v. Aldredge, 192 Ga. 12, 14 S.E.2d 456 (1941) (same).
290. See, e.g., Huff v. Watson, 149 Ga. 139, 99 S.E. 307 (1919).
291. See, e.g., Hampton v. Stevenson, 210 Ga. 87, 78 S.E. 32 (1953)
(habeas proceeding to obtain release of minor child from detention in
State Training School); Wingate v. Gornto, 147 Ga. 192, 93 S.E. 206
(1917) (habeas attack on commitment of juvenile female to Georgia
Training School for Girls); Baugh v. Lovvorn, 143 Ga. 827, 85 S.E. 1027
(1915) (habeas relief granted to child committed to institution by
superior courtjudge presiding over children's court branch of superior
court; statute establishing children's court was invalid); Law v. McCord,
143 Ga. 822, 85 S.E. 1025 (1915) (same); Rooks v. Tindall, 138 Ga. 863,
76 S.E. 378 (1912) (habeas proceeding to secure discharge of delinquent child held under commitment by judge of children's court);
Vandiver v. Associated Charities of August, 130 Ga. 413, 60 S.E. 999
(1908) (habeas proceeding by parent to recover custody of child whose
custody had been awarded by ordinary to benevolent society); Kennedy
v. Meara, 127 Ga. 68, 56 S.E. 243 (1906) (habeas proceeding by parent
to regain custody of child committed to benevolent institution by a
municipal recorder's court pursuant to state statute).
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292. See supra note 92. This statute, last codified as GA. CODE § 50105 (1933), was repealed in 1967. See Wilkes, From Oglethorpe to the
Overthrow of the Confederacy, supra note 3, at 1048 n.128.
293. In Jones v. Hill, 17 Ga. App. 151, 87 S.E. 755 (1915), the court
held that a judge denying the writ would be liable to the monetary
penalty only if the judge had acted "unreasonably, oppressively, or
corruptly . . . . " 17 Ga. App. at 158, 87 S.E. at 758. Ironically, the
defendant judge who was sued in this case was Fulton Superior Court
Judge Benjamin H. Hill, "an ardent defender of the rights of the
individual," Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., "AMost DeplorableParadox:"Admitting
Illegally Obtained Evidence in Georgia-Past,Present, and Future, 11 GA. L.
REV. 105, 120 (1976), who, while formerly serving for six years as the
first Chief Judge of the Georgia Court of Appeals, had authored the
opinion in Underwood v. State, 13 Ga. App. 206, 78 S.E. 1103 (1913),
perhaps the most eloquent, most sublime, and most magnificent prose
hymn in praise of constitutional rights ever written in the English
language.
294. 117 Ga. 305, 43 S.E. 780 (1903).
295. Donald E. Wilkes,Jr., A BrieffHistory of the WesternJudicialCircuit,
ATHENS HISTORIAN 1, 5-6 (2013).
296. 192 Ga. 634, 15 S.E.2d 873 (1941).
297. 188 Ga. 607, 4 S.E.2d 469 (1939).
298. South Dakota, for example, adopted the view that a denial of
due process divests the convicting court ofjurisdiction four years later,
in 1946, State ex rel. Henning v. Jameson, 71 S.D. 144, 148, 22 N.W.2d 731,
733 (1946). Connecticut did so in 1958, Wojculewicz v. Cummings, 145
Conn. 11, 19, 138 A.2d 512, 516 (1958), and Kentucky in 1963, Rice v.
Davis, 366 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Ky. 1963).
299. Although the decisions in their cases measurably advanced the
cause of human rights, the habeas petitioners in Wilcoxon and Aldredge
v. Williams were executed. After the Georgia Supreme Court on
September 13, 1939 overturned the judgment of the superior court
judge granting him habeas relief, Norman Williams was put to death in
the electric chair on May 15, 1942. Habeas petitioner Lewis Wilcoxon
also did not prevail on a claim of ineffective counsel. On March 27,
1942, in a followup habeas proceeding, the Georgia Supreme Court,
affirmed the superior court's ruling that Wilcoxon had not been denied
the effective assistance of counsel at his trial. On March 26, 1943, Lewis
Wilcoxon was electrocuted.
AMERICA 255 (1974).

WIILIAM

J.

BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN

300

JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN LEGAL HISTORY

300. See Edward Jenks, The Story of the Habeas Corpus, 18 IAw
REV. 64 (1902).

Q.

301. Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien, [1923] A.C. 603,
609 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
302. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 (1963).

